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Abstract
Analysis of Access Control systems is an important task to ensure that unauthorised
access to critical resources is protected. This thesis deals with a challenging problem
related to the analysis of Access Control systems which depend on time and location
against undesirable scenarios such as inconsistency. In particular, this thesis first provides
formal algebraic notations for the Access Control specifications in the context of a Spatio-
Temporal Role Based Access Control (STRBAC) model. This is followed by formulating
the terms of inconsistency and semi-consistency in STRBAC specifications, which are
accomplished with the help of the formal algebraic notations.
In order to analyse STRBAC specifications to detect inconsistencies and semi-consistencies,
this thesis utilises Alloy and Timed Automata. A key challenge is how to automatically
generate analysable formalisation such as Alloy and Timed Automata from the specifi-
cations. This thesis employs Model-Driven Architecture (MDA) technology to automate
the transformation of the STRBAC model to Alloy as well as to Timed Automata and
Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL). This is accomplished by defining one set of
transformation rules for mapping STRBAC features to Alloy features and another set for
mapping the features of the STRBAC model to Timed Automata and TCTL features.
Details of how we implement model transformation in the SiTra transformation engine
are also presented and described with the help of a case study. In addition, we present a
comparative study between Alloy and Timed Automata from capability and performance
points of view, following which we demonstrate that current Access Control models are
not adequate for representing Physical Access Control (PAC) specifications and then dis-
cuss some of the limitations of the current models, which we highlight by conducting a
case study involving the modelling of an Access Control mechanism used by British Tele-
com (BT). To overcome such limitations, we present an extension of the STRBAC model
which considers the physical aspects of Access Control systems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Information is considered a highly valuable asset for most businesses, and in today’s ex-
tremely competitive business environment, information assets need to be protected from
unauthenticated access. The disclosure of highly sensitive information about an organ-
isation’s consumers, strategic plans or products to a competitor could lead to a huge
financial losses, loss of reputation and legal liability [29]. Additionally, this information
could provide competitors with the opportunity to leapfrog the organisation [2, 29] in
terms of research and development advancement, as they would not need to incur the fi-
nancial and time burdens involved in this key area. Furthermore, they would also have the
opportunity to evolve counter-strategies to an organisation’s plans before such strategies
were even implemented. As such, the disclosure of critical information is almost impossi-
ble to recover from [2, 29]. Therefore, organisations have evolved various procedures and
systems – often known as information security – aimed at protecting information assets
from both internal and external threats [1]. The main security goal of information security
is to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, availability and assurance of information assets
[29, 61].
• Confidentiality : Privacy or the ability to control or restrict access so that only
authorised users can access information resources [29, 61]. Several approaches can
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be used to achieve this goal, such as Access Control.
• Integrity : Ensures that information is accurate and reliable and has not been subtly
changed or tampered with by an unauthorized party [29, 61].
• Availability : The ability of authorised users to access information resources when
they need or request it [29, 61].
• Assurance: Assurance is the degree of confidence in the security of the system with
respect to predefined security goals [61].
To summarise, the objective of information security is to deny information resource access
to unauthorised users whilst making it available to authorised users. This should be done
in a manner that does not adversely affect business operations [29, 31], so companies
invest heavily in this area. One of the technologies used to achieve this aim is Access
Control systems.
An Access Control system is one of the key stages in computer security, as it provides
the means of controlling which authority have access to which resources, as well as the
nature of such access [4, 5]. By making information resources available to authorised
users only, the mechanism ensures that only certain levels of data are available to certain
levels of user. Many models have been developed to construct and manage Access Control
systems that can be deployed by organisations to meet their information security needs,
such as Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [7], Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [8, 9]
and Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [3, 5, 10, 11].
Among these models, the RBAC model is receiving increasing attention as a gener-
alised approach to Access Control [3, 5, 10, 11]. A study carried out by NIST [3] shows
that in many organisations the Access Control decision is based on the user’s role and
responsibilities within the organisation, making the RBAC approach a perfect fit for ex-
pressing security requirements. Clark et al. [60] demonstrate that the more traditional
MAC and DAC models do not sufficiently address the various security requirements of
many organisations; however, the RBAC model can significantly simplify security admin-
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istration. For instance, if a person moves to a new job within the organisation, then
he/she can only be assigned to the new role and removed from the earlier role, while in
the absence of an RBAC model, his/her old a privilege should be cancelled and a new
privilege granted. In the RBAC model, roles can be structured into hierarchies to reflect
organisational functional hierarchies. Role hierarchy means that a senior role in an or-
ganisation will inherit the permissions of a junior role, and it can considerably decrease
explicit permission assignments to a role and therefore significantly reduce administration
overheads. Another important feature of the RBAC model is that it allows for express-
ing a variety of separation of duty constraints, which are beneficial in many applications
and help to reduce the risk of allowing a person conflicting roles or assigning a role that
results in conflicting permissions. Moreover, the RBAC model is policy-neutral [3, 11].
More specifically, by configuring a role-based system appropriately, one can support vari-
ous policies, including both MAC and DAC policies [5]. Such flexibility within the RBAC
model is very important, as it can be adapted to support the Access Control requirements
of enterprise-wide security administration and enforcement policies.
With increases in the growth of wireless networks, mobile devices and other tech-
nologies involved in the remote accessing of resources, we are moving towards an era
where contextual information such as spatial and temporal information will be essential
for Access Control [12, 56, 58]. For instance, a part-time PhD student in a university
may be authorised to access the university’s electronic library but only from the cam-
pus and during a specific period of time (i.e. January, February and March) every year.
If a part-time PhD student is represented by a role, enforcing such rules requires that
the student assumes the role in that time interval and on the university campus only.
This role may be restricted further to only pre-specified days and hours during the three
months. Traditional Access Control models, such as the RBAC model, cannot provide
such Spatio-Temporal based Access Control mechanisms, so they need to be augmented
in order to provide this function.
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In order to support Spatio-Temporal based Access Control, Ray and Toahchoodee
[12, 13] and other researchers [56, 57, 58] have proposed several Spatio-Temporal RBAC
models as extensions of the standard RBAC. The Spatio-Temporal Role Based Access
Control (STRBAC) model [12] is one such example and enhances the traditional RBAC
model by incorporating time and location conditions with RBAC entities, relationships
and constraints. In this model, users are assigned to roles based on time and location
constraints, while permissions are also assigned to roles on this basis. In addition, the
hierarchy of roles, the separation of duty and cardinality constraints are time and location
dependent. Formalisation of the STRBAC model is presented in this thesis with the help
of formal algebraic notations.
Incorporating the traditional RBAC model with both time and location information
increases the complexity of Access Control models even further. As a consequence, this
increases the possibility of contradictory statements in Access Control specification. Such
statements are commonly known as inconsistencies. A formal definition of the term in-
consistency in Access Control specifications is presented in this thesis. The existence of
inconsistency can be caused by an error in the specification resulting in incorrect system
implementation. On the other hand, it could be that system stakeholders are imposing
conflicting demands. In both cases, however, it is crucial that these demands are resolved
prior to the development of the system. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the specifica-
tions of such systems prior to their implementation; however, due to the complexity and
size of modern systems, discovering such inconsistencies is a formidable task and cannot
be carried out manually.
Another most important issue with the STRBAC model that we have encountered
is that, sometimes the STRBAC specification is consistent; however a minor change to
the specification by choosing an unsuitable allocation of the users to roles makes the
specification inconsistent. We refer to these as semi-consistency in the specification and a
formal definition of semi-consistency is provided in this thesis [16]. A semi-consistency is
a special case where the inconsistency can be avoided if the assignment of user to role is
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controlled. If we can identify such scenarios, then we can adopt pre-emptive measures by
providing certain constraints. This is particularly important, as these scenarios could pose
dangerous security issues which could actually cause a huge loose to the organisations. It
is therefore essential to perform an analysis of STRBAC models in order to identify any
semi-consistencies in the specifications.
Currently, Alloy [20, 21, 22] and Timed Automata [23, 24] are used widely for modelling
and analysing Access Control specifications because both are supported by automatic
tools which are capable of checking a sufficient number of constraints to detect conflicts
and inconsistencies. For example, Alloy is supported by the Alloy analyser tool, which is
an automated constraint solver that transforms Alloy code into Boolean expressions, thus
providing analysis through embedded SAT solvers, whereas Timed Automata is supported
by the Uppaal model checker [25], which allows for the verification of properties that are
expressed in Uppaal Requirement Specification Language. This language is a subset of
Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL) where primitive expressions are location names,
variables and clocks from the modelled system.
The main thesis of this research is to use Alloy and Timed Automata methods to
specify and analyse Access Control specifications in the context of STRBAC and then to
conduct a comparative study between the two methods from capability and performance
points of view. The comparison is based on the case study of a SECURE bank system
taken from [12].
Typically, the process of transformation between Access Control specifications and
formal methods such as Alloy or Timed Automata has been done manually [15, 80]. This
process, however, is prone to human error and is exceptionally time-consuming. There is
also the problem of scoping as system grows in size, whereby the manual generation of
formal models becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible. It is therefore essential to
have an automated tool that will extract a formal model from the system’s specifications
for formal analysis. The Object Management Group’s Model-Driven Architecture (MDA)
methodology makes it possible to generate a model from another model [26]. Therefore,
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in this thesis, we propose two MDA transformations to automate the transformation be-
tween the STRBAC specifications and Alloy and Timed Automata for the purpose of
analysis. More precisely, the first set of transformation resulting in a tool, AC2Alloy [27],
which automates the transformation between the STRBAC specifications and Alloy, thus
allowing for powerful analysis to be carried out via the Alloy analyser tool, whereas the
second set of transformation resulting in a tool called AC2Uppaal [28], which transforms
the STRBAC specifications into Timed Automata and TCTL [88] statements, following
which the produced Timed Automata network and TCTL statements are modelled and
verified using the Uppaal model checker. The proposed methods can be used in the early
phases of Access Control system development to ensure the consistency of the specifica-
tions. We evaluate our approaches by using the case study of a SECURE bank system
taken from [12].
Although the STRBAC model is very useful for providing a high-level description of
Access Control, especially in Cyber Access Control (CAC) systems, when time and loca-
tion information is required to grant or deny access to resources, it does not provide a
complete solution for all Access Control issues. This is because existing Access Control
models, including the STRBAC model, are not adequate enough to represent the phys-
ical aspects of Access Control systems. One of the more serious limitations of existing
Access Control models that we have come across when trying to model a Physical Access
Control (PAC) mechanism used by British Telecom (BT) is the representation of loca-
tions. Current models deal with logical locations, which may not be suitable for PAC
specifications. For instance, this thesis will argue that a logical location and a physical
location are different, in particular when dealing with hierarchies. Therefore, extending
current models in order to overcome such limitations is very important, because such an
extension will assist system designers to create the correct Access Control specifications
for supporting the physical aspect of Access Control. As a result, this thesis proposes a
new extension to Spatio-Temporal Role Based Access Control for physical systems [30] to
overcome such limitations. This involves introducing a graph capturing physical access to
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geographical locations within building. This approach is described through a case study,
which is provided by our industrial partner British Telecom (BT). An overview of the
proposed approach is presented in the next section.
1.2 Overview of our Approach
Figure 1.1 depicts an outline of our approach to developing two model-driven solutions
that could transform Access Control specifications in the context of STRBAC into for-
mal languages for the purpose of analysis. The first approach transforms the STRBAC
specifications into Alloy, while the second approach transforms them into Timed Au-
tomata and Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL) statements. In particular, in order
to develop the first MDA transformation the STRBAC metamodel was retrieved from the
specifications of the STRBAC. Moreover, a subset of Alloy metamodel was developed.
To conduct model transformation, a set of transformation rules was defined, which map
various elements of the source metamodel into the elements of the destination metamodel.
Using this approach, every STRBAC model that is an instance of a STRBAC metamodel
is automatically transformed into an Alloy model, which is an instance of Alloy meta-
model. Similarly, in order to develop the second MDA transformation, Timed Automata
and TCTL metamodels were developed. A number of transformation rules were defined
to map the elements of the STRBAC metamodel to these Timed Automata and TCTL
metamodels. Using this method, every STRBAC model that matches the STRBAC meta-
model is automatically transformed into Timed Automata network and TCTL statements
which are instances of Timed Automata and TCTL metamodels.
A detailed account of the contributions of this thesis is presented in the following
section.
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Figure 1.1: Overview of our Approach
1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
The contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• Formalisation of the STRBAC model. In particular:
1. Formal algebraic notations for the STRBAC model to specify its components
are provided.
2. A formal definition of inconsistency in STRBAC specifications is provided,
several examples of which are presented.
3. The concept of semi-consistency in STRBAC specifications is introduced, and
different scenarios that may cause this state are introduced.
• A model transformation framework (AC2Alloy) is developed and studied. In par-
ticular:
1. A subset of the STRBAC metamodel, which is expressive enough to model
basic components of the STRBAC model, such as Users, Roles, Permissions,
Times and Locations and their interrelations (such as User Role Assignment),
was identified.
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2. The transformation rules from the STRBAC metamodel elements into the Alloy
metamodel elements are defined.
3. The mapping rules from STRBAC to Alloy are implemented using the model
driven architecture technique SiTra.
4. The transformation rules are implemented as an eclipse plug-in called AC2Alloy.
• The AC2Alloy model transformation is evaluated using a case study.
• A model transformation framework (AC2Uppaal) is developed. In particular:
1. Transformation rules from the STRBAC metamodel elements to Timed Au-
tomata and TCTL metamodels elements are defined.
2. Mapping rules from STRBAC to Timed Automata and TCTL quires are im-
plemented using the model-driven architecture technique SiTra.
3. Transformation rules are implemented as an eclipse plug-in called AC2Uppaal.
• The AC2Uppaal model transformation is evaluated using a case study.
• A comparison study between Alloy and Timed Automata from capability and per-
formance points of view is presented.
• The current STRBAC model is extended to cover the physical aspect of Access
Control systems.
• A case study provided by our industrial partner British Telecom (BT) is used to
evaluate and demonstrate the feasibility of the presented approach.
1.4 Dissertation Structure
The rest of the dissertation is organised as follows.
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• Chapter 2 introduces the reader to preliminary concepts, such as Access Control
models, Alloy, Timed Automata and model driver architecture. Moreover, a review
of the existing literature on the analysis of Access Control specifications is discussed.
• Chapter 3 presents formal algebraic notations for the Spatio-Temporal Role Based
Access Control (STRBAC) model. In addition, it provides a formal definition of
inconsistencies and semi-consistencies as well as several example that may cause
these states in STRBAC specifications.
• In Chapter 4 we present the rules for transforming from STRBAC to Alloy and
describe how the STRBAC model can be transformed into Alloy in order to enable
automatic verification via the Alloy analyser.
• Chapter 5 describes how the transformation rules are implemented.
• Chapter 6 presents a AC2Uppaal model transformation which automates the trans-
formation between STRBAC specifications and Timed Automata as well as TCTL.
In particular, this chapter describes how the STRBAC model can be transformed
into Timed Automata and TCTL statements to enable automatic verification via the
Uppaal model checker. Moreover, it describes how to implement the transformation
rules.
• Chapter 7 presents a comparison between Alloy and Timed Automata from capa-
bility and performance points of view.
• Chapter 8 discusses the limitations of the STRBAC model for physical Access Con-
trol systems by using a PAC case study provided by BT. In order to overcome the
limitations of the STRBAC model this chapter presents our efforts to extend it
to cover the physical aspect of Access Control. Finally, this chapter makes use of
our AC2Alloy model transformation to analyse the specifications of physical Access
Control.
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• Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation and presents a discussion on proposals for
future directions.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND RELATED
WORK
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the relevant work categorised by the areas of
our research. In particular, we present a background to Access Control models and the
analysis of Access Control specifications using formal methods such as Alloy and Timed
Automata. In addition, it provides a brief description of Alloy and Timed Automata as
well as Model-Driven Architecture (MDA).
2.1 Access Control Model
With recent advances in mobile computing, wireless networks and other technologies in-
volved in the remote accessing of resources have prompted an urgent need for the creation
of an Access Control model which takes into consideration the location of the user and the
time of access. Such information is essential for controlling various spatio-temporally sen-
sitive applications in organisations which rely on the Access Control mechanism. Multiple
Access Control models are investigated and discussed in order to understand the problem
as well as to ensure that the Spatio-Temporal Role Based Access Control (STRBAC)
model is the most appropriate choice for this thesis.
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2.1.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
The term ‘Discretionary Access Control’ (DAC) [8, 9, 32, 33] refers to access that allows
users to alter the features of the object as well as to specify whether the object is accessible
to other users. In simple terms, a DAC could be a password file or specify whether a
particular file requires the knowledge and acceptance of the administrator while being
accessed by other users. The DAC mechanism has a basic inherent weakness, though,
in that it fails to recognise the fundamental differences between a human and computer
program users. Access controls are determined by the owner of the file or other resources.
The policy authorises the owner to choose which user has access to files, as well as what
privileges can be accessed by the user. The merit of DAC is its capability to allow users
access to data; however, the problem lies in its integrity. It is more fundamental to share
the information rather than to protect it.
DAC is working in the centralised level and also in the distributed level. The Cen-
tralised levels are those when the administrator can access the user Data and other in-
formation. The changes required accessing the data through the department. The disad-
vantages of centralised level are in the large organisation because it is very overwhelming
especially the administrators are outsourced. But in the distributed level it is good in the
large organisation because it has distributed levels, those that allow a known person to
access the data and other information service. It may be any single member for instance,
manger or team leader. The main advantage of the distributed level is that the delay can
be avoided when the administrator of account is away from the large area [33]. Following
are the concepts of Discretionary Access Control.
• Files and Data Ownership
In a system every object has an owner. The owner of the resources including files,
data, system resources and devices determines the access policy. So we can say that
an object without an owner is unprotected. This means that owner of the resources
is the person who creates the resources.
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• Access rights and permissions
In this policy control an owner can assign access right and permissions to the indi-
vidual user or group for specific resources.
2.1.2 Mandatory Access Control Policies (MAC)
The Mandatory Access Control (MAC) model was formalised by Bell and La-Padula
[7]. In comparison to the DAC, an MAC attempts to regulate users as well as process
resources pertaining to (higher level) security policy in any given organisation. The policy
encompasses rules and specifications which determine the type of access that is allowed
for each individual system. The system policy is highly relevant to MAC, in that it is
similar to the firewall ruling related firewalls. In the MAC mechanism, a user has to be
authorised in order to access an object. In the following, let us consider some examples
in order to develop a clear understanding of MAC.
In a MAC model, the system is the policy determinant rather than the owner. It
involves a multilevel system, which is capable of processing highly sensitive data, such
as government and military information, which implies that the Access Control policy
decision is far from the Access Control of individual objects. The central authority decides
which information has to be accessed and by which system, as well as by whom. If a user
is changed, it does not imply that system access will also change, as the main premise
is based on the MAC labelling each object, i.e. each object is protected by the MAC.
MAC security conditions imply that objects and applications are labelled by the system,
and the label applies to the entire object and provides access protection. The function
pertains to the protection of confidential and secret data; however, in the enterprise level
it is very difficult to classify. Therefore, MAC is not suitable in Enterprise level [7].
Consider the example of a doctor, a patient, a secretary and a nurse. Confidential data
may encompass the patient’s name as well as an appointment time. The doctor’s secretary
may be authorised to update or change the appointment time, but it is beyond the
authority of the nurse to do so. The nurse, however, is authorised to change any relevant
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information that must remain confidential to the outside world, which could include minor
information such as blood pressure or glucose levels as well as more important information
relating to a disease or health disorder. The doctor is authorised to change the blood
pressure or glucose levels as well as any other information that is relevant and confidential.
However, it is not necessary for the doctor to have access to confidential information such
as name and appointment times that pertain to the sensitive level. The example clearly
defines variables as well as the functioning of information flow in the concept of data,
and moreover information access. The hierarchical structure is given and implemented
in the MAC mechanism, which implies that the access applies to accessing information
that is secret and confidential. The advantage pertains to the data that is present in the
security label, and therefore the entire object is protected, thus negating any chance of
being accessed by unknown and/or unauthorised users [7]. The concepts behind MAC
are discussed below.
• Sensitive labels: these labels are assigned to all subjects and objects in the MAC
system. Subject sensitivity: determines the level of trust for the object so that, in
order to access the object, the subject must possess a trust level that is requested
or higher than requested [7].
• Data import and export: directs and monitors the flow of information from one
system to another [7].
• Proper labelling: the entire functioning of MAC security is based on the proper
labelling of the object, so as to ensure that confidential information is protected at
all times. There are two methods for prompt labelling, which are discussed below:
1. Rule-Based Access Control: This type of control defines specific constraints
for accessing a requested object. All MAC-based systems implement a simple
form of rule-based Access Control which determines whether access should be
granted or denied via a subject- or object-sensitive label [3].
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2. Lattice-Based Access Controls: A very complex Access Control decision which
involves many objects and/or subjects [35].
2.1.3 Role Based Access Control Policies (RBAC)
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [3, 5, 10, 11, 37] is another Access Control mechanism.
It was introduced more recently than the MAC and DAC and is based on control models
that cope with novel and altering resource hosts and users. RBAC involves simplifying
several policy aspects as well as policy administration.
As per the National Institute of Standard and Technology, a project – the RBAC
project – has been initiated with the purpose of designing a standardised Access Control
model that will benefit the design of the security level and also be self-system dependent.
The results of the implementation have been positive. The project was introduced by
Dived Ferriolo and Rick Khun, who attempted to meet the requirements and scope of the
RBAC solution in [3].
The key ideas behind the RBAC pertain to permissions related to the roles as well as
users assigned to each role. The functioning simplifies the management of roles as well as
users throughout the system. Roles pertain to undertaking several functions that influence
alignment as well as the users that are assigned to each role related to the function. These
roles are based on the qualifications and responsibilities of the user. The authority of the
user encompasses several functions, as they are often moved from one role to another.
Moreover, these roles and responsibilities represent a brand-new application and system
requiring such permissions [5].
RBAC involves controlling the roles and responsibilities of individual users in an or-
ganisation. Roles are defined so as to analyse the goals and structure of an organisation.
For example, in a medical organisation, there are nurses, doctors and patients, whereas in
a bank there are managers, directors and accountants. These types of people undertake
several roles and responsibilities whilst working for an organisation [11]. The approach,
which involves protecting the system from unauthorised access, is newer than Manda-
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tory Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary Access Control (DAC), both of which have
already been discussed in the chapter.
The approach of RBAC is different from the Access Control Lists (ACLs) that are used
in DAC systems, in which ACLs assign permissions to particular operations that relate
to overall organisational functioning, contrary to low-level data objects. For instance, an
ACL is authorised to grant or deny the access of a user to a particular file system, but it
does not determine the ways in which that particular file can be modified [37].
For RBAC permissions, several roles and responsibilities have to be assigned in order
to obtain access. A permission determines the operation that has to be carried out, as
well as on what resource and to what level of Access Control. It is mandatory for a user to
activate a set of roles and responsibilities pertaining to him as an individual. Each user has
multiple sessions relating to their roles and responsibilities; however, each role may have
one authorised user. RBACs support hierarchies very well and are good at defining an
inherited relationship between roles and responsibilities pertaining to a user. To prevent
any conflicts of interest within a business entity, RBACs allow for the separation of static
and dynamic duties. An overview of RBAC components is depicted in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Role Based Access Control Model [3]
The RBAC approach is highly beneficial [3, 5, 6, 37, 55] and includes the following
variables:
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• Group Objects : The RBAC approach provides user classification as per the execution
of activities. Similarly, it provides classification for objects, which are generally
categorised by type (letters, manuals) or the respective area of their application
(commercial, advertising letters). Furthermore, authorisation for access should be
based on the classification of objects rather than on specific objects. For instance, a
secretary could be given the role of reading and writing data, instead of authorising
every single letter in the data. The approach leads to a better and more controlled
authorisation regime. Furthermore, authorised access varies according to the object,
without needing to specify authorisations pertaining to each object [37].
• Security Management : The RBAC model determines the authorisation of users by
dividing the task into two further components – one that assigns roles and the other
that assigns permissions to an object. This mechanism leads to greater simplifi-
cation in security management. For example, when considering changing a user’s
responsibility level, most likely due to a promotion, the current role of the user
could be substituted for new roles in addition to new responsibilities. Therefore,
the changes would be concurrent with the authorised permission premise and con-
trol access to relevant and secret data. However, organisational hierarchies do not
change frequently, and neither does assigning permissions to roles or management
tasks [37].
• Data Abstraction: In spite of the provision of permissions for reading, writing or
executing, as commanded by the operating system, RBAC can establish abstract
permissions that authorise the credit and debit for a given object.
• Policy Neutrality : RBAC is policy-neutral, which means that it can be configured
to model the specifications of other Access Controls, e.g. MAC policies, in which
the system administrator maintains the access matrix or DAC policies and users
create and update security policies for their devices [38, 39, 40, 41].
• Supports Role Hierarchy : Organisational structures involve lines of authority that
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are referred to as a ’hierarchy’. The organisational structure encompasses the layout
reflected in the features of RBAC [37]; role hierarchy pertains relations between the
roles. The higher roles are at the top of the hierarchy, and therefore they are referred
to as senior roles, whereas the lower roles are classed as junior roles. The major
rationale behind RBAC relates to role management, in that senior roles may lead
to junior role authorisation and other relevant functions – they both depend on
the nature of the hierarchy as well as on each other. There is no need to assign
permissions separately to users on the same hierarchical level.
• Least Privilege: Guarantees that a user should only be given the privileges required
to complete the job [37]. Ensuring least privilege requires identifying what the user’s
job is, determining the minimum set of privileges required to perform that job, and
restricting the user to a domain with those privileges and nothing more.
• Supports Separation of Duties : Separation of duties protects the organisation from
fraudulent user activity [42] and relate to the invocation of mutually exclusive roles
relating to a sensitive task [42]. Moreover, it makes fraud very difficult to achieve.
2.1.4 Context-Aware Role Based Access Control Model
With the colossal usage of wireless networking, as well as mobile and sensor devices,
researchers have endeavoured to extend the RBAC to recognise the context information
that supports ubiquitous computing applications.
The concept of environmental roles was introduced by Covington et al. [44], who
introduced it in a generalised model of (GBRAC) to aid in Access Control relating to
private information and resources in ubiquitous computing applications. Environmental
roles in this model are entirely different from those specified in RBAC. However, there are
similar properties such as the separation of duty, role hierarchy and role activation. In
the Access Control framework, each element that has been assigned access permission has
a set of environmental roles underneath. These roles are activated as per any changing
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conditions specified in the environmental conditions. Furthermore, in a subsequent work
[45], the authors also specify the Context-Aware Security Architecture (CASA), which is
an implementation and application of the GRBAC model. Security services are provided
through Access Control in the architecture, whereby policies are expressed through the
execution of security management for roles. The environmental role activation pertains to
managing environmental role activation and deactivation, as per the context-management
variables.
As depicted by Chakraborthy et al. [46], another trust-based authorisation model
is ’TrustBAC’, which has its roots in the RBAC hierarchical framework. The model
has a feature whereby the user can activate a permission and access data in relation
to the level of trust he/she has been allocated for the system. The user’s trust level is
calculated for each individual user and is based on three factors: behaviour, knowledge
and recommendations by other users. The model also discusses the concept of trust
dominance, which is the same as inheritance hierarchy, although it does not account for
the separation of duty. In a similar approach, Ya-Jun [47] proposed Trust-based Access
Control (TBAC), based on the RBAC premise, in an extended form. It is useful for
roles where users are unknown and access privileges depend upon the level of trust set by
contextual information.
2.1.5 Temporal Aware Role Based Access Control
There are several other RBAC extensions, including the Temporal Role Based Access
Control Model (TRBAC) proposed by Bertino et al. [48]. The extension encompasses
a time dimension with all features that correspond to the RBAC framework. Bertino
et al. introduced the concept of role enabling and role disabling for a user. The model
determines the time at which a role can be enabled or disabled. This work was further
extended by Joshi et al. [49, 50, 51, 52] in what is known as the Generalized Temporal Role
Based Access Control Model (GTRBAC). The authors introduced two types of temporal
hierarchies, namely the permission inheritance hierarchy, where seniors are authorised to
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inherit the permission assigned to a junior role, and role activation, where a senior is
authorised to assign a role to a junior. The author further proposes Separation of Duty
(SoD), which involves two forms – weak and strong. The weak form considers that two
roles can be assigned at the same time, whereas the strong form works as a non-temporal
RBAC, in that two conflicting roles can be assigned to the same user at the same time.
2.1.6 Spatial Aware Role Based Access Control
Researchers have attempted to extend the standard RBAC in order to incorporate the
spatial information [53, 54]. As proposed by Bertino, the GEO-RBAC incorporate the
standard RBAC model with spatial information. The GEO-RBAC model supports spatial
hierarchy of roles and it is based on the location of an individual user [53]. Therefore, a
senior role is authorised with permissions that pertain to junior roles. However, this work
does not discuss the impact of spatial information on the separation of duties.
As depicted by Ray et al. [54], the components of RBAC are influenced by the location
of the user. The authors depict the model whilst using Z language specifications. Similarly,
the paper does not address role hierarchy or the separation of duties and does not discuss
the impact of location on time.
2.1.7 Spatio-Temporal Aware Role Based Access Control
Incorporating the standard RBAC model with spatial-temporal information has been
addressed by several works [56, 57]. Tuyen Le Thi et al. [56] propose a Spatial Temporal
Role Based Access Control (STRoBAC) model that can support both spatial and temporal
aspects and other contextual conditions as well as Access Control based on the role of the
subject. However, this study does not discuss the impact of time and location constraints
on entities of the RBAC model, such as User Role Assignment and Permission Role
Acquire. Another attempt on this subject was presented by Chen and Crampton in [57],
where the authors outlined a graph-based representation of a Spatio-Temporal RBAC.
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In this study, all of the elements of the RBAC model are represented by vertices, while
assignment relationships and hierarchical constraints are represented by the edges of the
graph. The authors categorised the model into three types: standard, weak and strong
models. For the standard model, element v1 can only be authorised to element vn, if all
vertices along the authorisation path satisfy time and location conditions. In the weak
model, however, an element v1 can be authorised to the element vn, if both vertices satisfy
time and location conditions. In the strong model, the element v1 can be authorised to
the element vn, but only if all vertices, together with the edges along the authorisation
path, satisfy time and location conditions. Even though the model presented in this study
has well-defined semantics, it does not consider all the elements of the RBAC model, such
as separation of duty constraints. In addition, it does not consider the time and location
properties of the object before granting or denying access.
In [58], Chndrn et al. propose a new model which combines the main components of
the GTRBAC model and the GEO-RBAC model. In the new model, roles are enabled for
users if the users satisfy certain time conditions. In addition, a user can activate a role if
the role is enabled to the same user and the user satisfies the location constraints related
to role conviction. However, the proposed model still has some limitations. For example,
the assignment between roles is not based on spatial or temporal conditions. There are
many motivating scenarios which indicate that user-to-role assignment should be based on
time and location constraints. Another example of these limitations is that the impacts
of spatial-temporal information on the separation of duties and the role hierarchy is not
addressed. Studying the impacts of time and location on role hierarchy and separation of
duty can be useful for real-world applications.
Another approach for integrating the RBAC framework with both time and location
was proposed by Samuel et al. in [59]. Samuel’s Generalized Spatio-Temporal Role
Based Access Control (GST-RBAC) model incorporates the existing GTRBAC model
with location constraints. In this study, the authors show the capability of the new
framework GST-RBAC to express some real-world constraints that are not possible in the
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existing GTRBAC model. Nevertheless, the GST-RBAC model still has some limitations
that should be overcome before being able to specify all the security requirements for real-
world applications. One of the limitations of the GST-RBAC model is that assignments
between roles and permissions are not based on time and location conditions. For instance,
when a user activates a role, all of the permissions assigned to the role can be accessed.
However, this might not be sufficient for real-world examples such as that described in
the summary of Chndrn’s work. Another example of limitations is that Samuel’s model
does not integrate time constraints into the separation of duty. Two conflicting roles
are allowed to activate if the user is in a different location during the same time period
when both roles are enabled. This might not be adequate for real-world applications; for
instance, if a user can activate a Teaching Assistant role in a school office, then the same
user should not be able to activate a Lab Operator role anywhere else during the same
period of time.
In order to overcome the limitations of the previous models, Ray et al. [12, 13] proposed
a Spatio-Temporal Role Based Access Control (STRBAC) model, which is an extension
of the traditional RBAC. The STRBAC model incorporates all the features of the RBAC
model, namely user role assignment, permission role acquire and role hierarchy, along with
time and location constraints. The new framework also introduces new features such as
separation of duty over roles, cardinality constraints over roles, cardinality constraints
over permissions, role delegation and permission delegation. In addition, the authors
discuss the impact of time and location constraints on all the newly introduced features.
This model has been used successfully to express many real-world constraints, such as the
Dengue Decision Support (DDS) system presented in [66]. Therefore, the STRBAC can
be considered a best choice for model Access Control specifications, especially when time
and location information are required. As a result, this thesis makes use of the STRBAC
model. In the next section we will describe a simplified version of the STRBAC model
for the purpose of this thesis. For more details about the STRBAC model we refer the
reader to [12, 13, 14, 15, 64, 66].
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2.1.7.1 Spatio-Temporal Role Based Access Control Model
The STRBAC model is an extension of the original RBAC model [3] that supports tem-
poral and location constraints. An advanced Access Control framework was introduced
in 2007 [12]. The STRBAC model is very useful for providing a high level of description
regarding Access Control, especially when time and location information is required to
grant or deny access to certain resources. Such information is essential for controlling
various Spatio-Temporal sensitive applications which rely on the Access Control mecha-
nism. For example, access to some resources in an organisation could be permissible but
only at a specific time and at a specific location. STRBAC does not provide a complete
solution for all Access Control issues such as the issues related the the Physical Access
Control (PAC) systems which will be discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis, but with its
rich specification it has proven to be cost-effective by reducing the complexity inherent
in the authorisation management of data when time information is required to grant or
deny access to the data, especially for Cyber Access Control (CAC) systems.
This thesis uses a simplified version of the STRBAC model defined in [12]. For ex-
ample, some elements, such as user role activation and delegation, are not considered in
this thesis. It is however possible to extend our approach to include such elements. This
simplified STRBAC model is defined in terms of seven model components:
• Core Spatio-Temporal Role Based Access Control (STRBAC).
The Core STRBAC model describes the basic concepts for the STRBAC, as shown
in Figure 2.2. These basic concepts are:
Figure 2.2: The Basic Concepts of the STRBAC Model
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1. Users (U)
A user is a human being or an autonomous agent.
2. Roles (R)
A role is a job function within an organisation with some associated permissions
to access protected resources.
3. Permissions (P)
A permission is the ability to perform a corresponding task on protected re-
sources.
4. Times (T)
A time can be represented as a set of time instances on the time line. For
example, a day can be divided into two categories – day time and night time.
5. Locations (L)
A location is represented as a set of logical entities.
6. User Role Assignment (URA)
In any organisation, roles are assigned to users based on time and location
constraints. This process is known as ‘user role assignment’. For example, user
‘Mark’ can access a lecturer’s role during the daytime at a school of computer
science. User role assignment is classed as a ‘many-to-many relationship’. For
example, a user can be assigned to one or more roles, and a role can have one
or more users.
7. Permission Role Acquire (PRA)
In organisations, roles are assigned to permissions based on time and location
constraints. This is known as ’permission role acquire’. For example, the
lecturer role can have to the permission modify the student mark during the
daytime and at the location school of computer science. Permission role acquire
is classed as a ‘many-to-many relationship’. For example, a role can be assigned
to one or more permissions, and a permission can have one or more roles
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assigned to it.
• Role Hierarchy (RH)
Normally, roles in an organisation have overlaps in permission assignments. For
example, a lecturer can have the same permissions as students to read a course
report, but he or she may also have additional permissions to add, delete or modify
the report. Therefore, role hierarchies are introduced as a key aspect of hierarchi-
cal STRBAC models, in which a user who has a senior role can inherit a junior
role and all the relevant permissions assigned to that particular junior role. Role
hierarchies can be unrestricted, time-dependent, location-dependent or time- and
location-dependent. An example of an unrestricted role hierarchy is shown in Fig-
ure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Role Hierarchy
• Location Hierarchy (LH)
Usually, organisations are based across several locations, some of which may also
contain inner locations. For example, a continent contains several countries and
a country contains several cities, as illustrated in Figure 2.4. Therefore, location
hierarchies are introduced as a key aspect of hierarchical STRBAC models, in which
a user who has a role at the outer location should also have the same role at the
inner location.
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Figure 2.4: Location Hierarchy
• Separation of Duty between Roles (SoDR)
The STRBAC model uses SoDR constraints to specify that two mutually exclusive
roles cannot be simultaneously assigned to the same user at the same time and at
the same location. For instance, the exclusive roles of ‘lecturer’ and ‘admission staff’
should not be assigned by the same user at the same time and at the same location.
• Separation of Duty between Permissions (SoDP)
The STRBAC model uses SoDP constraints to specify that two mutually exclusive
permissions cannot be simultaneously assigned to the same role at the same time
and at the same location. For instance, the exclusive permissions modify student
mark and process new student application should not be assigned by the same role
at the same time and at the same location.
• Cardinality Constraint over Roles (CCR) This approach restricts the number of
users who can have a role at the same time and at the same location. For instance,
there should be only one user in the school of computer science that can have the
role ‘head of school’ at the same time and at the same location.
• Cardinality Constraint over Permissions (CCP)
This restricts the number of roles that can have a permission at the same time and
at the same location. For example, there should be only one role that can have
the permission ‘modify head of school’ profile at the same time and at the same
location.
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2.2 Analysis of the Access Control Model
There is a plethora of work using formal languages for modelling Access Control specifi-
cations so that they can be analysed. Some have used the Z language [17] for modelling
RBAC [68] and LRBAC [69]. The authors described how the Z language can be used
to represent the RBAC model and its features in a formal manner. However, the lan-
guage itself lacks the tools to support the automatic analysis of the formalised model.
Others have used an extension of the Unified Modelling Language (UML) [70], known
as ’parametrised UML’, to visualise the properties of RBAC constraints. The model
describes how one can visualise the conflicts that may occur with RBAC constraints.
However, it still lacks the ability to perform automatic model analysis. To this end, re-
searchers [18, 19, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75] have investigated other approaches, such as Coloured
Petri Nets (CPNs), for modelling Access Control specifications so that an automatic anal-
ysis can be performed. Jiang et al. [72] described how these CPNs can be used in verifying
the security properties of the Bell LaPadula (BLP) model. Another study, presented by
Laborde et al., proposed the use of CPNs for verifying the standard RBAC specification
of network security mechanisms in [73]. In particular, the focus of this study was on
verifying confidentiality, integrity and availability, as well as filtering rules.
Lu et al. [74] demonstrated how the Access Control specifications of work flows can
be analysed using coloured Petri nets. In particular, they explained how to formalise
control flow and authorisation rules, and how to conduct separation of duty constraints in
a work flow in the presence of a role activation hierarchy. The authors first described how
to model each part (i.e. control flow and separation of duty) in isolation. Subsequently,
they proposed an approach for producing an integrated model which allows one to study
interactions between the parts, such as an RBAC authorisation policy with separation of
duty constraints. Reachability analysis was used to detect conflicts between the features.
The size of the integrated model increased exponentially when new entities were added,
so one of the major limitations of this approach is scalability. Another drawback of this
work is that the model analysed does not support many features that are needed in work
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flow applications, such as separation of duty between permissions.
Alloy [20], which uses SAT-solvers for analysis, has also been used successfully for
the analysis of Access Control specifications [76, 77, 78, 79]. Alloy is a language used
for modelling and specifying object-oriented systems, and it is supported by a tool called
’Alloy analyser’. The analyser is an automated constraint solver that transforms Alloy
code into Boolean expressions, thus providing analysis via its embedded SAT solvers.
Jackson et al. [76] demonstrated how to use Alloy to verify the internal consistency of an
RBAC-96 schema. This study established that using Alloy has sufficient expressive power
to prescribe implementation-independent specifications for Access Control systems. A
similar approach was presented by Schaad et al. [77, 78], who modelled RBAC entities (e.g.
users, roles), relations (user role assignment, role-permission assignment) and constraints
such as role hierarchy and static separation of duties using Alloy. However, both of these
studies did not consider environmental information such as time and location, which is
needed in many applications today. Additionally, the transformation between RBAC and
Alloy was carried out manually. For a small system, the creation of a model transformation
between the RBAC model and Alloy could be managed manually; however, due to the
complexity and size of modern systems, an automated transformation is required.
Another effort to verify the consistency of Access Control specification using Alloy was
proposed by Samuel et al. [79]. This work illustrates how various features of the GST-
RBAC model can be modelled and then analysed using Alloy. In a similar study, Ray
et al. proposed using Alloy to model and analyse interactions between various features
of the STRBAC model [14, 15]. The analysis process aimed to detect several types of
inconsistencies that may occur due to interactions between the model’s features. However,
in both of these studies, transformations between Access Control specifications and Alloy
were carried out manually. Although the transformation presented seems to be correct,
in general, manual transformation is tedious and may cause errors, especially when the
Access Control specification is very large.
Researchers such as [80, 81] have also advocated the use of Timed Automata mod-
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elling and the analysis of Access Control policies. Samrat et al. [80, 81] demonstrated
how to model and analyse the properties of a GTRBAC model using Timed Automata.
The authors determined how to transform GTRBAC into Timed Automata models, fol-
lowing which a desirable set of liveness and safety security queries are constructed from
the GTRBAC constraints. These queries are used later in the model verification process,
which is done by using the Uppaal model checker [25, 82]. Although this study made
it possible to perform an automated analysis of GTRBAC specifications, there were two
major limitations. First, the impact of location on the Access Control specification is
not discussed in this study, which is required in many applications today. The second
limitation is that the Timed Automata network and the security queries were generated
manually – manual transformation is tedious and may introduce unintended errors, es-
pecially when the Access Control specification is very large. Therefore, it is essential to
automate the transformation between the Access Control specification and formal meth-
ods such as Timed Automata. As a result, this thesis presents a model transformation
approach that automates the transformation between the STRBAC model and formal
languages such as Alloy and Timed Automata for the purpose of analysis.
2.3 Alloy
Alloy is a language used for modelling and specifying object-oriented systems. It is based
on first-order logic and was developed by the MIT Software Design Group in 1997 [20].
It is roughly a subset of the Z notation. Alloy is designed to bring a Z-style specification
to the kind of automation offered by model checkers. Generally, an Alloy model consists
of a set of modules, each of which consists of one or more paragraphs. The paragraphs
of a module can be signatures, relation declarations, facts, predicates, or check com-
mands. Signatures are used to define new sets of atoms. Constraints, such as facts and
predicates, are used to specify constraints and expressions. A fact is a constraint that
always holds and consists of an optional name, while a predicate is a constraint that
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can be instantiated in different contexts and has a name. Commands such as check are
an instruction to the Alloy analyser to perform an analysis. A check command helps to
search for a counterexample showing that the model is inconsistent. Figure 2.5 presents
the subset of an Alloy metamodel. For the purposes of this thesis, we have not considered
all of the features of the Alloy language, which is explained fully by Jackson in [20].
Figure 2.5: A Subset of an Alloy Metamodel [107]
Alloy is supported by an Alloy analyser [85], which supports the fully automated anal-
ysis of Alloy models. The analyser provides two main functionalities, namely simulations
(run command) and assertions (assertion and check command). Simulation produces a ran-
dom instance of the model which conforms to the specification. Assertions are constraints
which the model needs to satisfy. The Alloy analyser works by translating Alloy formulas
to Boolean expressions with the help of the KodKod [86] model finder. The Boolean
expression is then automatically analysed using SAT solvers (i.e. SAT4J [84], ZChaff [83]
and MiniSAT [87]), and the result of the analysis is then displayed to the user. The Alloy
analyser is designed to perform finite scope checks, even on infinite models. Therefore,
the user should specify a scope for the model elements to bound the domain. Without
specifying a scope, Alloy will assume there are three atoms of everything unless specified
otherwise. A scope is a positive integer number which limits the number of instances of
each model element if the system is being analysed by the Sat-solver. If the analyser finds
a counterexample within the scope, the assertion is not valid. However, if no counterex-
ample is found, the assertion might be invalid in a larger scope. For more details on the
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notion of scope, please refer to [[22], Sect. 5].
In the following section, we will describe a small Alloy model to demonstrate the most
commonly used features of Alloy. The Alloy model is depicted in Figure 2.6. Line 1 of
the Alloy model declares an abstract signature called Person. Marking a signature as an
abstract means that it has no elements of its own that do not belong to its extensions.
This abstract signature has two fields – the first field is called children, in line 2, and the
second field is named siblings, in line 3. The children and siblings fields declare ordered
pairs, who’s first, and the second coordinates consist of instances of the abstract signature
Person. The keyword set in the field’s declaration means that there can be zero or any
number of Persons related to Person through the relations children and siblings. Line
4 declares a signature named Man, which is a subset of the Person set due to extend
Person, which is part of the signature declaration. The keyword one, before the signature
declaration, specifies that the signature Man will be represented by a unique set. The
signature declarations in line 5 and line 6 are similar to the signatures declaration already
described. Line 8 declares a function called parents, which defines the parents’ relation
as an auxiliary one. Line 9 defines a fact constraint. The body of the fact constraint
specifies that no person can be their own ancestor. An empty simulation command, which
is defined in line 10, will produce a random instance of the model that conforms to the
facts. The for 3 part of the command specifies the scope for the elements of the system.
More precisely, the Alloy analyser will attempt to produce an instance of the model,
using up to three atoms for each of the signatures declared in the model. In this example
the analyser will use a scope of three only for the Married signature, since the Person
signature has been specified as abstract and the Man and Woman signatures are specified
as singleton. Line 11 declares an assertion named ChildrenArenotParents, which specifies
that no person has parents that are also children. Finally, in line 13, a check command
is defined, which asks the Alloy analyser to confirm the assertion ChildrenArenotParents
for a scope of three.
The execution of check (line 13 in Figure 2.6) shows that the Alloy analyser has found
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1. abstract sig Person {
2. children: set Person,
3. siblings: set Person}
4. one sig Man extends Person {} 5
5. one sig Woman extends Person {}
6. sig Married in Person {
7. spouse: one Married } 10
8. fun parents [] : Person -> Person { ~children }
9. fact {no p: Person | p in p.^parents}
15
10. run {} 3
11. assert ChildrenArenotParents {
12. all p: Person | no p.children & p.parents }
20
13. check ChildrenArenotParents for 3
Figure 2.6: A Sample of an Alloy model
no counterexample for the scope of three, which means that the assertion may be valid
or the Alloy analyser might find a counterexample on a larger scope.
2.4 Timed Automata
Alur and Dill [24] introduced the idea of Timed Automata (TA), which is a directed graph
containing a finite set of locations and a finite set of labelled edges extended with real-
value variables that model logical clocks. In TA, time information is represented as a finite
set of clocks which can be reset by state transitions. All the clocks progress synchronously
when time elapses. An initial clock valuation maps each clock of a timed automaton to
zero. A location or a state is associated with a clock constraint called the ‘local invariant’
of that location. Control can stay in a location but only if the clock valuation satisfies
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the local invariant of that location. Local invariants are used to ensure the progress of
the model [24], namely that a control cannot stay in a location forever. An edge in a
timed automaton is called a transition, which is associated with a clock constraint, a
subset of the clocks and a label (with a symbol). A clock constraint associated with
a transition is called the ’guard’ of that transition. A transition will be taken only if
the guard is satisfied. Guards are used to restrict the behaviour of the automation, and
each associated clock of a transition is reset to zero when the transition occurs. At any
given instant, the value of a clock equals the time elapsed since the last time it was reset.
While transitions are instantaneous, time can elapse in a location. Next we define Timed
Automata formally.
Definition 1. Timed Automata (TA) are 6-tuples (S, Init,
∑
, C, Inv, T), where S is a
finite set of states, Init ∈ S is the initial state, ∑ is a finite set of actions/labels, C is a
finite set of clocks, Inv is a mapping that labels each state s with some clock constraints in
Φ(C) and T is the transition relation. The transition (s; a;λ; δ; s′) represents a transition
from state s to state s′ on event a.
Figure 2.7 depicts graphically a Timed Automata (TA) metamodel in the shape of a
UML class diagram. The TA metamodel captures most of the concepts required for this
thesis, such as state, transition and clock. To describe the concepts of Timed Automata,
we will consider the following simple Timed Automata example, presented in Figure 2.8,
with one clock c. The figure shows that s is the initial location and that it has no invariant
constraint. This means that the system can be at this location for an arbitrary amount
of time. When the system switches to another location s’ or even a, the clock c resets
to zero. While in location s’, the value of the clock c illustrates the time elapsed since
the occurrence of the last transition. The transition from location s’ to location s can be
taken only if this value is greater than 1. The invariant c 6 2 associated with location s’
specifies the requirement that the system can stay in location s’ for at most 2 units and
a transition must occur before the invariant is violated. For more details about Timed
Automata we refer the reader to [23, 24, 34, 36, 89, 90, 91].
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Figure 2.7: Timed Automata Metamodel [36]
Figure 2.8: A sample Timed Automata [34]
2.4.1 Uppaal
Uppaal is a famous model checker created for extended Timed Automata by Yi-Wang
et al. [25, 92]. It also supports model checking for conventional Timed Automata. The
Uppaal model checker allows for the verification of specifications that are expressed in
the Uppaal Requirement Specification language. This language is a subset of Timed
Computation Tree Logic (TCTL), where primitive expressions are represented by location
names, variables and clocks from the modelled system. In addition, Uppaal supports local
and global integers and primitive operations on integers, such as addition, subtraction and
multiplication with constants. Such expressions are also allowed on transition guards. A
model of the system can be created from multiple Timed Automata which are synchronised
via CCS-like synchronisation mechanisms [92]. In this thesis, we use the Uppaal model
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checker to model and verify Timed Automata networks and TCTL statements.
2.5 Model-Driven Architecture (MDA)
The Model-Driven Architecture, abbreviated to MDA, is a standard initially introduced
and developed by the OMG (Object Management Group), which has been an interna-
tional, open membership, not-for-profit computer industry consortium since 1989 [93, 94].
It is one of the most important research initiatives in the model-driven engineering (MDE)
area. Model-Driven Architecture (MDA) is a software design approach for modelling in
software development. One of its main objectives is the idea of model transformation,
which is central to the work presented in this thesis. In general, model transformation
is considered a program that takes as its input a graph of objects and provides as an
output another graph of objects. In the MDA context, a model transformation is defined
by mapping the constructs of the metamodel of a source language into the constructs of
the metamodel of a destination language, and then every model which is an instance of
the source metamodel can be automatically transformed to an instance of the destination
metamodel with the help of a model transformation framework [95, 96]. The metamodels
of the source and target languages are specified using a common language known as the
Meta Object Facility (MOF) [97], while models in the MDA are instances of metamodels.
Figure 2.9 depicts an MDA transformation approach. It shows that a typical model
transformation framework requires the following inputs: source and target metamodels
and a number of transformation rules. A set of transformation rules is used to define how
various elements of the source metamodel are mapped to the elements of the destination
metamodel. Then every model which conforms to the corresponding metamodel can be
automatically transformed into a model that conforms to the target metamodel. For
example, to map an Access Control specification in the context of the STRBAC model
into formal languages such as Alloy or Timed Automata, a model transformation approach
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Figure 2.9: Overview of the MDA transformation Approach
that maps the elements of the STRBAC metamodel to the elements of the formal language
metamodel is required.
Researchers have developed many industrial and academic case tools to support model
transformations, such as Kermeta [98, 99], Arcstyler [103], OptimalJ [104], Xactium [105]
and ATLAS [100, 101, 102]. Despite the fact that these tools allow for the specification
and implementation of model transformations, which provide a rich set of functionalities,
such tools are inherently complex. In particular, for researchers who are only interested
in experimentation and the creation of prototypes, the steep learning curve is a significant
hurdle. Therefore, in this thesis, we make use of Simple Transformer (SiTra) [108, 109],
which provides a minimal framework for the execution of transformations to implement
the transformation rules.
2.5.1 Simple Transformer (SiTra)
SiTra is a simple Java library developed by Akehurst et al. [108] to support a programming
approach to writing transformations aiming to use Java for writing transformations, and
it provides a solution for small-scale transformations. SiTra consists of two interfaces,
as depicted in Figure 2.10 – rule interface, which user-defined mapping rules have to
implement, and the transformer interface, which provides a framework for the methods
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that carry out the transformation. The SiTra user needs only to define the transformation
rules by implementing the rule interface, which consists of three methods: check(), build()
and setProperties(). If the rule is applicable to the source element in question, the check()
method of the rule implementation returns as true and the build() method is executed.
The build() method generates the target model element. The setProperties() is used to set
the attributes and links of the newly created target element. SiTra has been successfully
applied to model transformation in various application domains [27, 28, 106, 110, 111, 112].
For further details on SiTra please refer to [108, 109].
interface Rule<S,T> {
boolean check(S source); 25
T build(S source, Transformer t);
void setProperties(T target, S source, Transformer t);
}
interface Transformer {
Object transform(Object source); 30
List<Object> transformAll(List<Object> sourceObjects);
<S,T> T transform(Class<Rule<S,T>> ruleType, S source);
<S,T> List<T> transformAll(Class<Rule<S,T>> ruleType,
List<S> source);
} 35
Figure 2.10: SiTra Interfaces
Traceability is an important feature in model transformations, and as such it has
received considerable attention [62, 63, 65, 67, 100] recently. Traceability is typically used
during the model transformation process to keep a record of which element(s) of the source
model(s) has been transformed to which element(s) of the destination model(s) and visa
versa. In the context of model transformation, traceability can have many applications.
For instance, if the source model has been changed slightly after executing the model
transformation, traceability links can be used to update only the necessary elements of
the destination model, without having to execute the whole transformation again. Tracing
in SiTra consists of an instance (ITrace), which holds a set of TraceInstances (ts). Every
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TraceInstances represents the mapping between the elements of the source and the target
model, using a SiTra rule. For more details and a classification of traceability with SiTra,
please refer to [67]. Figure 2.11 depicts the model for tracing M2M transformations.
Figure 2.11: A Model of the Tracing Mechanism
2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter provides a structured review of Access Control models and the verification
of Access Control specification. Following this, it provides a brief introduction into Model
Driven Architecture. Regarding the analysis of Access Control specifications, our research
indicated that existing works have proposed several approaches such as Alloy and Timed
Automata for modelling and analysing of Access Control specifications to detect incon-
sistencies. However, none of these works provide a method that automatically generates
the analysable formalisation (i.e. Alloy and Timed Automata) from the Access Control
specifications. In subsequent chapters, we will discuss our model transformation methods
which fulfil this gap.
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CHAPTER 3
FORMALISATION OF THE SPATIO-TEMPORAL
ROLE BASED ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
As explained in Section 1.2. this work proposes MDA transformations to transform Ac-
cess Control specifications in the context of a STRBAC model into Alloy and Timed
Automata to perform an automated analysis. The aim of the analysis is to detect in-
consistencies that may occur during interactions between Access Control specifications.
Our approach is achieved as follows. Firstly, the formalisation of the STRBAC model is
presented in Chapter 3. This is considered an important task, as it helps to formalise
any inconsistencies in the STRBAC specifications. In addition, it helps to specify the
STRBAC components that will be used to define the model transformations. Secondly,
the first model transformation, which transforms the STRBAC into Alloy, is described in
Chapter 4. Then, the implementation of the model transformation as an eclipse plug-in
is discussed in Chapter 5. Fourthly, the second model transformation, which automates
the transformation between the STRBAC and Timed Automata and its implementation
as an eclipse plug-in, is discussed in Chapter 6. Fifthly, a comparison study between
the presented Alloy and Timed Automata approaches is explained in Chapter 7. Finally,
an extension of the STRBAC model, to cover the physical aspects of Access Control, is
presented in Chapter 8.
In this chapter, we discuss the first step, which is the formalisation of the STRBAC
model. This includes providing formal algebraic notations for the STRBAC framework.
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These formal algebraic notations will be used later in this chapter to develop a formal
definition of inconsistency in the STRBAC specifications [16, 113] as well as define differ-
ent scenarios that might cause inconsistencies therein. Moreover, these formal algebraic
notations will be used to introduce the concept of semi-consistency in the STRBAC spec-
ifications and define several examples in this case. Last but not least, the formal algebraic
notations will be used in the next chapters to define our model transformations, in or-
der to automate the transformation between the STRBAC and formal methods such as
Alloy and Timed Automata, thus allowing for powerful analysis to take place to detect
inconsistencies and semi-consistencies in the STRBAC specifications.
3.1 Formal Algebraic Notations of STRBAC
This section introduces formal algebraic notations for the STRBAC model to specify the
components which will be used in this thesis.
Definition 2. Suppose that U, R, P, T, L are finite and non-empty sets of Users, Roles,
Permissions, Times and Locations, respectively. In this case, an Access Control specifi-
cation A can be seen as a subset of the Cartesian product U × R × P × T × L. We write
(u, r, p, t, l) ∈ A, meaning that the user u is assigned to the role r and has permission
p at the location l and at that time t. The five tuples (u, r, p, t, l) are generated from
the interactions between the Access Control rules, which are defined next. These rules
specify permissible coordinates for the five tuples.
3.1.1 User Role Assignment (URA)
This is a relation that associates users with roles based on time and location, URA ⊆ U ×
R × T × L. We write URA(u, r, t, l), meaning that a user u is assigned to a role r at time t
and location l.
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3.1.2 Permission Role Acquire (PRA)
This relation associates roles with permissions based on time and location PRA ⊆ R × P ×
T × L. We write PRA(r, p, t, l), meaning that a role r is assigned to a permission p at time t
and location l.
3.1.3 Role Hierarchy (RH)
This is a transitive partial order on the set of roles, RH ⊆ R × R × T × L. We write ri  rj,
meaning that the role ri is senior to the role rj at any time and at any location. This
means that ri inherits all the permissions of rj, and if there is a user assigned to a senior
role ri then he/she can also be assigned to the junior role rj. RH can be unrestricted,
time-dependent, location-dependent or time- and location-dependent and written as ,
t, l and t,l , respectively.
• Unrestricted Role Hierarchy (URH): Let ri and rj be roles such that ri  rj, i.e. the
role ri is a senior role to the role rj at any time and at any location.
∀ri, rj ∈ R (ri  rj), then
∀u ∈ U, ∀t ∈ T, ∀l ∈ L URA(u, ri, t, l) =⇒ URA(u, rj , t, l) ∧
∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀l ∈ L PRA(rj , p, t, l) =⇒ PRA(ri, p, t, l)
• Time-Dependent Role Hierarchy (TRH): Let ri and rj be roles such that ri t′ rj, i.e.
the role ri is a senior role to the role rj only at time t′ and at any location.
∀ri, rj ∈ R, ∀t′ ∈ T (ri t′ rj), then
∀u ∈ U, ∀l ∈ L URA(u, ri, t′, l) =⇒ URA(u, rj , t′, l) ∧
∀p ∈ P, ∀l ∈ L PRA(rj , p, t′, l) =⇒ PRA(ri, p, t′, l)
• Location-Dependent Role Hierarchy (LRH): Let ri and rj be roles such that ri l′ rj,
i.e. the role ri is a senior role to the role rj only at the location l′ and at any time.
∀ri, rj ∈ R, ∀l′ ∈ L (ri l′ rj), then
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∀u ∈ U, ∀t ∈ T URA(u, ri, t, l′) =⇒ URA(u, rj , t, l′) ∧
∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T PRA(rj , p, t, l′) =⇒ PRA(ri, p, t, l′)
• Time- and Location-Dependent Role Hierarchy (TLRH): Let ri and rj be roles such
that ri t′,l′ rj, i.e. the role ri is a senior role to the role rj only at the time t′ and at
location l′.
∀ri, rj ∈ R, ∀t′ ∈ T, ∀l′ ∈ L (ri t′,l′ rj), then
∀u ∈ U URA(u, ri, t′, l′) =⇒ URA(u, rj , t′, l′) ∧
∀p ∈ P PRA(rj , p, t′, l′) =⇒ PRA(ri, p, t′, l′)
3.1.4 Location Hierarchy (LH)
This is a partial order on the set locations that specifies which location contains another
location, LH ⊆ L × L. We write li  lj, meaning that the location li is an outer location to
the inner location lj. This means that if there is a user who is assigned to the role r at
the outer location li, then he/she can also be assigned to the role r at the inner location
lj, and if the role r has a permission p at the outer location li, then the role r should also
has the same permission p at the inner location lj.
∀li, lj ∈ L (li  lj), then
∀u ∈ U, ∀r ∈ R, ∀t ∈ T URA(u, r, t, li) =⇒ URA(u, r, t, lj) ∧
∀p ∈ P, ∀r ∈ R, ∀t ∈ T PRA(r, p, t, li) =⇒ PRA(r, p, t, lj)
3.1.5 Separation of Duty between Role (SoDR)
We write sodr(ri, rj , t′, l′), meaning that the two exclusive roles ri and rj should not be as-
signed to the same user at time t′ and location l′. SoDR can be unrestricted sodr(ri, rj), time-
dependent sodr(ri, rj , t′), location-dependent sodr(ri, rj , l′) or time- and location-dependent
sodr(ri, rj , t
′, l′).
• Unrestricted Separation of Duty over Roles (SoDR): Let ri and rj be exclusive roles
such that sodr(ri, rj), i.e. the role ri and the role rj should not be assigned to the
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same user at any location and at any time.
∀ri, rj ∈ R sodr(ri, rj), then
∀t ∈ T, ∀l ∈ L, ¬∃u ∈ U URA(u, ri, t, l) ∧ URA(u, rj , t, l)
• Time-Dependent Separation of Duty over Roles (TSoDR):
Let ri and rj be exclusive roles such that sodr(ri, rj , t′), i.e. the role ri and the role rj
should not be assigned to the same user at the time t′ and at any location.
∀ri, rj ∈ R, ∀t′ ∈ T sodr(ri, rj , t′), then
∀l ∈ L, ¬∃u ∈ U URA(u, ri, t′, l) ∧ URA(u, rj , t′, l)
• Location-Dependent Separation of Duty over Roles (LSoDR):
Let ri and rj be exclusive roles such that sodr(ri, rj , l′), i.e. the role ri and the role rj
should not be assigned to the same user at the location l′ and at any time.
∀ri, rj ∈ R, ∀l′ ∈ L sodr(ri, rj , l′), then
∀t ∈ T, ¬∃u ∈ U URA(u, ri, t, l′) ∧ URA(u, rj , t, l′)
• Time- and Location-Dependent Separation of Duty over Roles (TLSoDR):
Let ri and rj be exclusive roles such that sodr(ri, rj , t′, l′), i.e. the role ri and the role
rj should not be assigned to the same user at the time t′ and the location l′.
∀ri, rj ∈ R, ∀t′ ∈ T, ∀l′ ∈ L sodr(ri, rj , t′, l′), then
¬∃u ∈ U URA(u, ri, t′, l′) ∧ URA(u, rj , t′, l′)
3.1.6 Separation of Duty between Permissions (SoDP)
We write sodp(pi, pj , t′, l′), meaning that the two exclusive permissions pi and pj should
not be assigned to the same role at time t′ and location l′. SoDP can be unrestricted
sodp(pi, pj), time-dependent sodp(pi, pj , t′), location-dependent sodp(pi, pj , l′) or time- and
location-dependent sodp(pi, pj , t′, l′).
• Unrestricted Separation of Duty between Permissions (USoDP):
Let pi and pj be exclusive permissions such that sodp(pi, pj), i.e. permission pi and
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permission pj should not be assigned to the same role at any location and at any
time.
∀pi, pj ∈ P sodp(pi, pj), then
∀t ∈ T, ∀l ∈ L, ¬∃r ∈ R PRA(r, pi, t, l) ∧ PRA(r, pj , t, l)
• Time-Dependent Separation of Duty between Permissions (TSoDP):
Let pi and pj be exclusive permissions such that sodp(pi, pj , t′), i.e. permission pi and
permission pj should not be assigned to the same role at the time t′ and at any
location. ∀pi, pj ∈ P, ∀t′ ∈ T sodp(pi, pj , t′), then
∀l ∈ L, ¬∃r ∈ R PRA(r, pi, t′, l) ∧ PRA(r, pj , t′, l)
• Location-Dependent Separation of Duty between Permissions (LSoDP):
Let pi and pj be exclusive permissions such that sodp(pi, pj , l′), i.e. permission pi and
permission pj should not be assigned to the same role at the location l′ and at any
time.
∀pi, pj ∈ P, ∀l′ ∈ L sodp(pi, pj , l′), then
∀t ∈ T, ¬∃r ∈ R PRA(r, pi, t, l′) ∧ PRA(r, pj , t, l′)
• Time- and Location-Dependent Separation of Duty between Permissions (STSoDP):
Let pi and pj be exclusive permissions such that sodp(pi, pj , t′, l′), i.e. permission pi
and permission pj should not be assigned to the same role at the location l′ and at
the time t′.
∀pi, pj ∈ P, ∀t′ ∈ T, ∀l′ ∈ L sodp(pi, pj , t′, l′), then
¬∃r ∈ R PRA(r, pi, t′, l′) ∧ PRA(r, pj , t′, l′)
3.1.7 Cardinality Constraints over Roles (CCR)
We write ccr(ri, t′, l′, n), meaning that the role ri has restrictions, so it should not be as-
signed to more than n users at time t′ and location l′. CCR can be unrestricted ccr(ri, n),
time-dependent ccr(ri, t′, n), location-dependent ccr(ri, l′, n) or time- and location-dependent
ccr(ri, t
′, l′, n).
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• Unrestricted Cardinality Constraints over Roles (UCCR):
Let the role ri be a restricted role, such that ccr(ri, n), i.e. role ri should not be
assigned to more than n users at any time and any location. This should satisfy the
following constraint:
∀ri ∈ R (ri, n), then
∀u ∈ U, ∀t ∈ T, ∀l ∈ L #(URA(u, ri, t, l)) ≤ n
• Time-Dependent Cardinality Constraints over Roles (TCCR):
Let the role ri be a restricted role, such that ccr(ri, t′, n), i.e. role ri should not be
assigned to more than n users at time t′ and at any location. This should satisfy
the following constraint:
∀ri ∈ R, ∀t′ ∈ T (ri, t′, n), then
∀u ∈ U, ∀l ∈ L #(URA(u, ri, t′, l)) ≤ n
• Location-Dependent Cardinality Constraints over Roles (LCCR):
Let the role ri be a restricted role, such that ccr(ri, l′, n), i.e. role ri should not be
assigned to more than n users at location l′ and at any time. This should satisfy
the following constraint:
∀ri ∈ R, ∀l′ ∈ L (ri, l′, n), then
∀u ∈ U, ∀t ∈ T #(URA(u, ri, t, l′)) ≤ n
• Time- and Location-Dependent Cardinality Constraints over Roles (TLCCR): Let the
role ri be a restricted role, such that ccr(ri, t′, l′, n), i.e. role ri should not be assigned
to more than n users at time t′ and location l′. This should satisfy the following
constraint.
∀ri ∈ R, ∀t′ ∈ T, ∀l′ ∈ L ccr(ri, t′, l′, n), then
∀u ∈ U #(URA(u, ri, t′, l′)) ≤ n
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3.1.8 Cardinality Constraints over Permissions (CCP)
We write ccp(pi, t′, l′,m), meaning that permission pi has restrictions, in which case it
should not be assigned to more than m roles at time t′ and location l′. CCP can be un-
restricted ccp(pi,m), time-dependent ccp(pi, t′,m), location-dependent ccp(pi, l′,m) or time-
and location-dependent ccp(pi, t′, l′,m).
• Unrestricted Cardinality Constraints over Permissions (UCCP):
Let the permission pi be a restricted permission, such that ccp(pi,m), i.e. permission
pi should not be assigned to more than m roles at any time and any location. This
should satisfy the following constraint:
∀pi ∈ P ccp(pi,m), then
∀r ∈ R, ∀t ∈ T, ∀l ∈ L #(PRA(r, pi, t, l)) ≤ m
• Time-Dependent Cardinality Constraints over Permissions (TCCP):
Let the permission pi be a restricted permission, such that ccp(pi, t′,m), i.e. permis-
sion pi should not be assigned to more than m roles at time t′ and any location. This
should satisfy the following constraint:
∀pi ∈ P, ∀t′ ∈ T (pi, t′,m), then
∀r ∈ R, ∀l ∈ L #(PRA(r, pi, t′, l)) ≤ m
• Location-Dependent Cardinality Constraints over Permissions (LCCP):
Let the permission pi be a restricted permission, such that ccp(pi, l′,m), i.e. permis-
sion pi should not be assigned to more than m roles at location l′ and any time. This
should satisfy the following constraint:
∀pi ∈ P, ∀l′ ∈ L (pi, l′,m), then
∀r ∈ R, ∀t ∈ T #(PRA(r, pi, t, l′)) ≤ m
• Time- and Location-Dependent Cardinality Constraints over Permissions (STCCP):
Let the permission pi be a restricted permission, such that ccp(pi, t′, l′,m), i.e. per-
mission pi should not be assigned to more than m roles at time t′ and location l′.
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This should satisfy the following constraint:
∀pi ∈ P, ∀t′ ∈ T, ∀l′ ∈ L ccp(pi, t′, l′,m), then
∀r ∈ R #(PRA(r, pi, t′, l′)) ≤ m
3.2 Formalisation of Inconsistency and Semi-consi-
stency in the STRBAC Specification
In this section we provide a formal definition of inconsistency in the STRBAC specifi-
cation and then we present several examples of inconsistencies in the same setting. We
also introduce the concept of semi-consistency in the STRBAC specification. A semi-
consistency is a special case whereby the inconsistency can be avoided if the assignment
of the user to a role is controlled [16, 113]. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, we
are the first to introduce this concept of semi-consistency. Finally, this section presents
different scenarios that may cause semi-consistencies in the STRBAC specification.
3.2.1 Inconsistency in the STRBAC Specification
Various rules within the STRBAC model make the design of an Access Control system
more simple by breaking down a complex specification into various rules, so that, for
instance, User Role Assignment and Separation of Duty between Roles can be considered
separately. However, multiple rules may result in inconsistency when they interact with
each other. If this is the case, then there is no subset A of the Cartesian product U × R ×
P × T × L that satisfies all the STRBAC rules. As a result, an inconsistent specification
means that it is not possible to find the tuples (u, r, p, t, l), so that the coordinates
satisfy all rules (User Role Assignment, Permission Role Acquire, Role Hierarchy, Location
Hierarchy, Separation of Duty constraints and Cardinality constraints).
Definition 3. Suppose that URA, PRA, RH, LH, SoDR, SoDP, CCR and CCP is a set of Access
Control rules. An Access Control specification is termed inconsistent if there are no
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non-empty sets A ⊆ U × R × P × T × L such that A satisfies all Access Control rules.
In [114, 115], Chao Huang et al. present examples of inconsistencies that might occur
during interactions between different RBAC rules. Following their examples, we also list
here some examples of inconsistencies in the STRBAC specification that came across
during our studies.
• Inconsistency between User Role Assignment (URA) and Separation of Duty over
Roles (SoDR). For example, ∃u ∈ U, ∃t ∈ T, ∃l ∈ L, ∃ri, rj ∈ R sodr(ri, rj) ∧ URA(u, ri, t, l)
∧ URA(u, rj , t, l).
Inconsistency is caused by interactions between the URA and the SoDR, because the
user u accesses the two conflicting roles ri and rj, which is not permissible according
to SoDR.
• Inconsistency between User Role Assignment (URA) and Cardinality Constraint over
Roles (CCR). For example, ∃u ∈ U, ∃t ∈ T, ∃l ∈ L, ∃ri ∈ R ccr(ri, n) ∧ #|URA(u, ri, t, l)| > n.
There is also inconsistency in the specification, which is caused by interactions
between the URA and the CCR, because the number of User Role Assignments for the
restricted role ri is larger than n, which violates the cardinality constraint.
• Inconsistency between User Role Assignment (URA) and Role Hierarchy (RH). For
example, ∃ri, rj , rk ∈ R, ∃u ∈ U, ∃t ∈ T, ∃l ∈ L (ri  rj) ∧ (rj  rk) ∧ (rk  ri) ∧
(URA(u, ri, t, l) ∨ URA(u, rj , t, l) ∨ URA(u, rk, t, l)).
There is also inconsistency in the specification, caused by interactions between URA
and RH, because the cycle of RH allows the user, who is assigned to the junior role,
to get permissions for senior roles.
• Inconsistency between User Role Assignment (URA), Permission Role Acquire (PRA)
and Separation of Duty between Permissions (SoDP). For example, ∃u ∈ U, ∃r ∈ R, ∃t
∈ T, ∃l ∈ L, ∃pi, pj ∈ P sodp(pi, pj) ∧ URA(u, r, t, l) ∧ PRA(r, pi, t, l) ∧ PRA(r, pj , t, l).
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There is also inconsistency caused by interactions between the URA, PRA and the SoDP,
because URA allows a user u to access role r, which is assigned to the two conflicting
permissions pi and pj and is not permissible according to (SoDP).
• Inconsistency between User Role Assignment (URA), Role Hierarchy (RH) and Sepa-
ration of Duty between Roles (SoDR). For example, ∃u ∈ U, ∃t ∈ T, ∃l ∈ L, ∃ri, rj ∈ R
(ri  rj) ∧ sodr(ri, rj) ∧ URA(u, ri, t, l) .
There is also inconsistency between URA, RH and SoDR, because the user u can gain
access to the two conflicting roles ri based on URA and rj based on URA and RH, which
is not permissible according to SoDR.
• Inconsistency between User Role Assignment (URA), Role Hierarchy (RH), Permission
Role Acquire (PRA) and Separation of Duty between Permissions (SoDP). For example,
∃u ∈ U, ∃ri, rj ∈ R, ∃t ∈ T, ∃l ∈ L, ∃pi, pj ∈ P (ri  rj) ∧ sodp(pi, pj) ∧ URA(u, ri, t, l) ∧
PRA(rj , pi, t, l) ∧ PRA(rj , pj , t, l).
There is also inconsistency between the URA, PRA, RH and the SoDP, because a user
u can access role ri based on URA, and, based on RH, the same user u can access
role rj, which is assigned to the two conflicting permissions pi and pj, which is not
permissible according to SoDP.
The list above is not exhaustive, as we have only considered the unrestricted RH, SoDR,
SoDP, CCR and CCP to define our chosen scenarios. As such, there could be many more com-
plicated scenarios composed from the above scenarios when the time-dependent, location-
dependent and time- and location-dependent constraints are considered.
3.2.2 Semi-consistency in STRBAC Specification
In this section we introduce the term ‘semi-consistency’ in the STRBAC specification.
Semi-consistency is a weak form of consistency, in that the system is not inconsistent
but it can be potentially inconsistent following a minor change to the specification [16].
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Consider an Access Control specification that contains the following statements: a SoDP
statement claims that the two permissions p2 and p2 should not be assigned by the same
role at time t and location l, while a PRA statement claims that a role r can have the two
permissions p2 and p2 at any time and at any location. Although these two statements
are contradictory, there will be no inconsistency in the specification if no user is assigned
to the role r at time t and location l. A minor change, for example assigning a user to
the role r, will result in inconsistency. We refer to such scenarios as semi-consistency.
Definition 4. We call an Access Control specification S semi-consistent if i) is consistent
(see Definition 3 in Section 3.1), ii). There are a finite number of users u1, u2, ...., un ∈ U
and roles r1, r2, ...., rn ∈ R, so that if a new specification S ′ consisting of S in addition to
ura(u1, r1, t, l), ura(u1, r1, t, l), ...., ura(un, rn, t, l), so that S ′ is inconsistent.
Remark:. It is possible changing PRA can cause inconsistency. For example, assume that
the permissions p1 and p2 are conflicted permissions, which means the two permissions p1
and p2 should not be assigned to the same role at the same time and the same location.
Changing the PRA by assigning a role r to the permissions p1 and p2 at the same time
and the same location will cause inconsistency. We decided not to consider such changes
in the specifications as a cause of semi-consistency as specified in Definition 3. This is
because we argue that changes in PRA mean changes in the organisation’s Access Control.
This will happen much less frequently than adding users. We assume that when the PRA
changes, we analyse everything from scratch.
In the case of semi-consistency we may try to either modify the specification to remove
that semi-consistency or we may add logical constraint (Java assertions) to avoid an inap-
propriate user role assignment. In effect, the idea is to identify bad user role assignment
which may cause inconsistencies, therefore preventing them from happening in the first
place. Next we present some examples involving semi-consistencies.
• Semi-consistency because of an Interaction between Permission Role Acquire (PRA)
and Separation of Duty between Permissions (SoDP). For example, ∃r ∈ R, ∃t ∈ T, ∃l
∈ L, ∃pi, pj ∈ P PRA(r, pi, t, l) ∧ PRA(r, pj , t, l) ∧ sodp(pi, pj).
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The above specification is semi-consistent because a minor change, for example
assigning a user to the role r, at the time t and the location l allows the user to have
the two conflicting permissions p1 and pj, which are assigned to the role r at time t
and location l. Such changes should be prevented.
• Semi-consistency because of Role Hierarchy (RH). For example, ∃ri, rj , rk ∈ R, ∃t ∈ T,
∃l ∈ L (ri  rj) ∧ (rj  rk) ∧ (rk  ri).
The above specification is semi-consistent because a minor change, for example
assigning a user to one of the roles ri, rj or rk, at time t and location l will result in
inconsistency. Such changes should be prevented.
• Semi-consistency because of an Interaction between User Role Assignment (URA)
and Cardinality Constraints over Roles (CCR). For example, ∃u1 ∈ U, ∃r ∈ R, ∃t ∈ T,
∃l ∈ L ura(u1, r, t, l) ∧ ccr(r, t, l, 2).
The above specification is semi-consistent because a minor change, for example
including ura(u2, r, t, l) and ura(u3, r, t, l), will result in inconsistency. Such changes
should be prevented.
3.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we introduced details about the formalisation of the STRBAC model.
Session 3.1 explains the formal algebraic notations for all components of the STRBAC
model. These formal algebraic notations are used in Section 3.2 to present a formal
definition of inconsistency in the STRBAC specifications and to describe various examples
of inconsistencies in the same instance. Next, the concept of semi-consistency and several
examples of semi-consistencies in STRBAC specifications are discussed. Based on the
above foundation and the background information introduced in Chapter 2, we are ready
to define the model transformations that take place between formal representations, such
as Alloy and Timed Automata, and the STRBAC specification.
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CHAPTER 4
AC2ALLOY: TRANSFORMATION BETWEEN
STRBAC AND ALLOY
As discussed in Chapter 2, using formal methods such as Alloy is always beneficial for
modelling and analysing Access Control specifications. However, the transformation pro-
cess between formal methods and Access Control specification is challenging, because the
process of creating formal representation for analysis is manual and done by a human
modeller. As a result, it is prone to human error and is time-consuming. There is also
a problem of scoping as a system grows in size, whereby the manual generation of for-
mal models becomes extremely difficult, if not totally unfeasible. As a result, this work
utilises a Model-Driven Architecture approach to automate the transformation between
the STRBAC model and Alloy.
In this chapter, a model transformation, AC2Alloy [27] is introduced. AC2Alloy pro-
vides a framework for STRBAC models to be transformed into Alloy, thus allowing for
powerful analysis to take place using Alloy analyser utilising SAT-Solvers. To conduct the
model transformation, a set of transformation rules have been defined. The transforma-
tion rules map various elements of the source metamodel, STRBAC into the elements of
the destination metamodel, Alloy. For each rule an informal reasoning on why a particular
STRBAC component maps to a particular Alloy concept is provided.
Before explaining our approach, a simplified example of The SECURE bank system
taken from [29] will be introduced, for demonstration purposes.
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4.1 A Running example: The SECURE bank System
In this section, a simplified version of the example given by Ray et al. [29] will be provided
in order to demonstrate our approach. This example is based on a typical SECURE bank
system consisting of several security policies. The application is used by various bank offi-
cers to perform several transactions (e.g. on customer loan accounts) at different locations
and during specific periods of time. The SECURE bank system consists of the follow-
ing: four users Dave, Mark, Hanna and Sarah; two locations Office1 and Office2; four roles
Teller, Accountant, Accounting Manager and Loan Officer; and four permissions Read and
Write Teller Files (RWTF), Read and Write Loan Officer Files (RWLF), Read and Write
Accountant Files (RWAF) and Read and Write Accounting Manager Files (RWAMF). The secu-
rity policies for the SECURE bank system are given below.
4.1.1 Security Policies
• User Role Assignment: Users are assigned to roles in the banking system as
illustrated in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: User Role Assignment Constraints
Users Roles Times Locations
Mark Accounting Manager DayTime Office1
Hanna Accountant DayTime Office1
Sarah Loan Officer DayTime Office2
Sarah Teller DayTime Office2
Dave Accounting Manager NightTime Office1
• Permission Role Acquire: Roles are assigned to permissions in the banking
system as illustrated in Table 4.2.
• Role Hierarchy: Some roles in the SECURE bank system are related using re-
stricted role hierarchy as follows: Role Hierarchy= {rhtl(Accounting Manager, Accountant,
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Table 4.2: Permission Role Acquire
Roles Permissions Times Locations
Teller WRTF: Read and Write Teller
Files
DayTime Office2
Loan Officer WRLF: Read and Write Loan
Files
DayTime Office2
Accountant WRAF: Read and Write Ac-
countant Files
DayTime Office1
Accounting Manager WRAMF: Read and Write Ac-
counting Manager Files
NightTime Office1
DayTime, Office1)}, which means the role Accounting Manager is a senior role to the
Accountant role during the DayTime and at the location Office1.
• Separation of Duty between Roles: There are two separation of duty con-
straints between roles in the SECURE bank system. Separation of Duty Over
Roles={sodrtl(Teller, Loan Officer, DayTime, Office2), sodrtl(Accountant, Teller,
DayTime, Office1)}. This means that the role Teller and the role Loan Officer should
not be assigned to the same user during the DayTime and at the location Office2 and
the role Teller and the role Accountant should not be assigned to the same user
during the DayTime and at the location Office1.
• Separation of Duty between Permissions: There is one separation of duty
between permissions in the SECURE bank system. Separation of Duty Over Per-
missions={sodptl(RWTF, RWLF, DayTime, Office2)}. This means that the permissions
Read and Write Teller Files (RWTF) and Read and Write Loan Files (RWLF) should not
be assigned to the same role during the time DayTime and at the location Office2.
• Cardinality Constraints over Roles: There is one restricted cardinality con-
straint over roles in the SECURE bank system. Cardinality Constraints over Roles=
{ccrtl(Accountant, DayTime, Office1, 1)}. This means that the maximum number
of users that should be assigned to the Accountant role during the DayTime and at the
location Office1 is One.
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• Cardinality Constraints over Permissions: There is one restricted cardinality
constraint over permissions in the SECURE bank system. Cardinality Constraints
over Permission={ccptl(Read and Write Accountant Files (RWAF), DayTime, Office1,
1)}. This means that the maximum number of roles that should be assigned to
permission RWAF during the DayTime and at Office1 is One.
4.2 AC2Alloy – Model Transformation
AC2Alloy is an automated approach that makes use of MDA techniques to transform
STRBAC models into Alloy. The model transformation process is hereby described in
three stages:
• Metamodels for the source and target models.
• Transformation rules to map the elements of the STRBAC and Alloy.
• Implementation of the transformation rules (which will be discussed in Chapter 5).
In order to use an MDA methodology to automate the transformation between STRBAC
and Alloy, metamodels for the source model, STRBAC model and the target model,
an Alloy model needs to be constructed to specify the elements of STRBAC that will be
mapped to Alloy. The Alloy metamodel is presented in Section 2.3. In this work, we do not
consider the complete features of the Alloy language, but instead depict only those features
that are used in our transformation. The metamodel of the STRBAC, on the other hand,
is declared in the XML Schema Definition (XSD) [116]. XSD is a document structure
and type definition specification, which provides the syntax specification and constraints
for both structure and content. Figure 4.1 depicts the core elements of the STRBAC
metamodel specified in XSD. A more elaborate version of the STRBAC metamodel is
presented in Appendix A.
Figure 4.1 illustrates that there are 13 elements in the STRBAC metamodel that
should be mapped into Alloy features. Next we shall describe our transformation rules for
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<xs:element name="STRBAC">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Users" type="userType" />
<xs:element name="Roles" type="roleType" />
<xs:element name="Permissions" type="permissionType" />
<xs:element name="Times" type="timeType" />
<xs:element name="Locations" type="locationType" />
<xs:element name="UserRoleAssignment" type="URAType" />
<xs:element name="PermissionRoleAquire" type="PRAType" />
<xs:element name="RoleHierarchy" type="RHType" />
<xs:element name="LocationHierarchy" type="LHType" />
<xs:element name="SoDR" type="SODRType" />
<xs:element name="SoDP" type="SODPType" />
<xs:element name="CardinalityRole" type="CRType" />
<xs:element name="CardinalityPermission" type="CPType" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
Figure 4.1: Elements of the STRBAC Metamodel
mapping the elements of the STRBAC metamodel to the elements of the Alloy metamodel.
4.3 Transformation Rules
This section describes the second stage of the model transformation process where any
STRBAC models that conform to the STRBAC metamodel transform into Alloy. This
requires us to define a set of 13 transformation rules to map the elements of the STRBAC
into Alloy features – one for each element. These transformation rules are written in Java.
Figure 4.2 depicts the correspondence between the elements in the STRBAC and Alloy.
Next we describe these rules to demonstrate challenging aspects of the transformation.
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Figure 4.2: Overview on the Transformation Rules
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4.3.1 Rule 1: Transformation of Users to Alloy
As previously established, ‘Users’ in the STRBAC model represents a finite set of users.
As depicted in Figure 4.2, users are transformed into an equivalent Alloy code which
consists of an abstract signature and one or more one extends signatures. More precisely,
the set of users i.e. Users={u1, u2, ......., um}, will be mapped into an abstract signature
and every element in the set of users i.e. u1 will be mapped into one extends signature,
as depicted in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Transformation of Users to Alloy
For example, the set of users in the SECURE bank system, as described in Section 4.1,
consists of the following users (Dave, Sarah, Hanna, Mark) and will be transformed into the
following Alloy code.
abstract sig Users {}
one sig Dave extends Users {}
one sig Sarah extends Users {}
one sig Hanna extends Users {}
one sig Mark extends Users{}
Figure 4.4: Alloy code for the set of users in the SECURE bank system
This means that the abstract signature Users has no elements except those belong to
its extension (Dave, Sarah, Hanna, Mark). These elements are unique atoms because they
are specified as singletons. Figure 4.5 presents the transformation rule that maps users
to Alloy, which is written in Java.
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import JAXB2.STRBAC;
import JAXB2.UserType;
import sitra.Rule;
import sitra.Transformer;
public class Users2Alloy implements Rule{
public boolean check(Object source) {
if(source instanceof STRBAC.Users){ return true; }
else{ return false; } }
public String build(Object source, Transformer t) {
try{ STRBAC.Users users = (STRBAC.Users)source;
String userAlloy = "abstract sig User{}\n";
abstract user sig String innerAlloy = "";
int size = users.getUser().size();
int count = 0;
if(users.getUser().size() > 0){
for(UserType user : users.getUser()){
if(size > 1){ innerAlloy += user.getUserId() + ", "; count ++;
if(count == 7){ innerAlloy+= "\n"; count = 0; } }
else{ innerAlloy += user.getUserId(); }
size --; }
userAlloy += "one sig " + innerAlloy + " extends User{}\n"; }
else { userAlloy += " "; }
return userAlloy; }
catch(Exception e){ return null; } }
public void setProperties(Object target, Object source,
Transformer t) { } }
Figure 4.5: Code for the Users2Alloy transformation rule
Similarly, the sets of permissions, times and locations are mapped to abstract signatures
and their elements are mapped to one extend signatures in Alloy.
4.3.2 Rule 2: Transforming Roles to Alloy
‘Roles’ in the STRBAC model is defined as a finite set of roles. As depicted in Fig-
ure 4.2, roles are mapped into Alloy code which consists of abstract signature, one
extends signatures, facts and predicates. More precisely, the set of roles, i.e. Roles={r1,
r2, ....., rn}, will be mapped into an abstract signature and every element in the set of
roles, i.e. r1, will be mapped into one extends signature, fact and predicate, as depicted
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in Figure 4.6. Inside the abstract signature, four Alloy relations, namely time, location,
permissions and users, are defined. These relations are created to represent the rela-
tionships between roles, users, permissions, times and locations. Such relationships are
expressed by User Role Assignment (URA), Permission Role Acquire (PRA), Role Hierarchy
(RH) and Location Hierarchy (LH) with the help of predicates which are generated for
every role.
Figure 4.6: Transformation of Roles to Alloy
The multiplicity keyword lone, which means zero or one, is used to control the relation
between roles and times as well as between roles and locations, while set, which means
zero or more, is used to control the relation between roles and users as well as between
roles and permissions. The four relations inside the abstract signature, which represent
the assignments between Roles, Users, Permissions, Times and Locations are empty at
this stage because the User Role Assignment (URA) and the Permission Role Acquire (PRA)
have not been transformed yet. Therefore, the constant none, which represents an empty
relation, is used as depicted in Figure 4.6 to specify that all the relations between the role
r1 and other elements are empty.
For example, the set of roles in the SECURE bank system as described in Section 4.1
consists of the users (Teller, Accounting Manager, Loan Officer, Accountant) which will be
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transformed into the following Alloy code.
abstract sig Roles{
time: lone Times,
location: lone Locations,
permissions: set Permissions,
users: set Users}
one sig AcMan extends Roles{}
fact AcMan_fact{all self: AcMan | AcManCondition[self]}
pred AcManCondition[self: AcMan]{((self.permissions= none)&&
(self.location= noen)&&(self.time= none)&&(self.users= none))}
one sig Teller extends Roles{}
fact Teller_fact{all self: Teller | TellerCondition[self]}
pred TellerCondition[self: Teller]{((self.permissions= none)&&
(self.location= noen)&&(self.time= none)&&(self.users= none))}
one sig Accountant extends Roles{}
fact Accountant_fact{all self: Accountant | AccountantCondition[self]}
pred AccountantCondition[self: Accountant]{((self.permissions= none)&&
(self.location= noen)&&(self.time= none)&&(self.users= none))}
one sig LoanOfficer extends Roles{}
fact LoanOfficer_fact{all self: LoanOfficer | LoanOfficerCondition[self]}
pred LoanOfficerCondition[self: LoanOfficer]{((self.permissions= none)&&
(self.location= noen)&&(self.time= none)&&(self.users= none))}
Figure 4.7: Alloy code for the set of roles in the SECURE bank system
The transformation rule for roles has been defined in this way to constrain the number
of Alloy signatures in our model and thus to enable larger Access Control models to be
created and analysed. This is because it has been found that the tuples produced from
signatures decrease the scalability of the approach.
4.3.3 Rule 3: Transformation of User Role Assignment (URA)
The User Role Assignment (URA) is a relation that defines how roles are assigned to
users based on time and location conditions. As described in the previous section, the
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predicates created with the Alloy code for the roles are used to represent relationships
between users, roles, permissions, times and locations, such as User Role Assignment
(URA). Therefore, the execution of this transformation rule will update the predicates
within the Alloy code for the roles by adding new assignment information, as depicted
in Figure 4.2. For example, the transformation of the following User Role Assignment
URA={(u1, r1, t1, l1), .........., (um, rn, tk, lo)} will inject the predicates into the Alloy code for
roles with new assignment information (i.e. (u1, r1, t1, l1) will inject the predicate created
for the role r1 with new assignment information), as depicted in Figure 4.8. There are
three possible cases for the execution of this rule:
Figure 4.8: Transformation of User Role Assignment
Case 1: If a role is only assigned to one user at the same time and the same location.
Figure 4.8 illustrates this case when role r1 is only assigned to user u1 at time t1 and
location l1.
Case 2: If a role is assigned to more than one user at the same time and the same
location. Figure 4.9 illustrates this case when r1 is assigned to users u1, u2, ......., um at
time t1 and location l1.
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Figure 4.9: Transformation of User Role Assignment – Case 2
Case 3: If a role is assigned to one or more users but at a different time or different
locations. Figure 4.10 illustrates this case when r1 is assigned to users u1, u2, ......., um at
time t1 and location l1 and assigned to users u1, u2, ......., un at time t2 and location l1.
Figure 4.10: Transformation of User Role Assignment - Case 3
In the three cases above, we consider that the Permission Role Acquire has not be
transformed yet, which means there will be no permission assigned to the role r1. There-
fore, the constant none is still used to represent the relation between roles and permissions,
as depicted in Figure 4.8, Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10. However, if the Permission Role
Acquire is already transformed (i.e. permission p1 is assigned to role r1 at time t1 and at
location l1), the transformation of User Role Assignment can be done in the same way as
described in case 1, case 2 and case 3, although the constant none will be replaced with
permission p1.
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4.3.4 Rule 4: Transformation of Permissions Role Acquire (PRA)
The Permission Role Acquire (PRA) is a relation that defines how roles are assigned to
permissions based on time and location conditions. As described in Section 4.3.2, the
predicates created with the Alloy code for the roles are used to represent the relationships
between roles, permissions, times and locations, such as Permission Role Acquire (PRA).
Therefore, the execution of this transformation rule will update the predicates within the
Alloy code for the roles by adding new assignment information, as depicted in Figure 4.2.
For example, The Permission Role Acquire PRA={pra(r1, p1, t1, l1), .........., pra(rn, px, tk, lo)}
will inject the predicates into the Alloy code for roles with new assignment information
(i.e. pra(r1, p1, t1, l1) will inject the predicate created for the role r1 with new assignment
information), as depicted in Figure 4.11. There are three possible cases for the execution
of this rule:
Figure 4.11: Transformation of Permission Role Acquire
Case 1: If a role is only assigned to one permission at the same time and the same
location. Figure 4.11 illustrates this case when role r1 is only assigned to permission p1
at time t1 and location l1.
Case 2: If a role is assigned to more than one permission at the same time and the
same location. For example, if role r1 is assigned to permissions p1, p2, ......., px at time
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t1 and location l1. This case is similar to Case 2 in Section 4.3.3 and can be described in
the same way.
Case 3: If a role is assigned to one or more permissions but at different times or
different locations. For example, if role r1 is assigned to permissions p1, p2, ......., pq at
time t1 and location l1 and assigned to permissions p1, p2, ......., pq at time t2 and location
l1. This case is similar to Case 3 in Section 4.3.3 and can be described in the same way.
In the three cases above we consider that the User Role Assignment has not been
transformed yet, which means there will be no user assigned to role r1. Therefore, the
constant none is still used to represent the relation between roles and users, as depicted
in Figure 4.11. However, if the User Role Assignment is already transformed (i.e. user u1
is assigned to role r1 at time t1 and at location l1), the transformation of the Permission
Role Acquire can be done in the same way as described in case 1, case 2 and case 3,
although the constant none will be replaced with user u1.
4.3.5 Rule 5: Transformation of Role Hierarchy (RH)
Role hierarchy, as described in Section 3.1.3, specifies which roles are senior to other
roles. This means that a user who has a senior role can also have a junior role and its
permissions and the senior role can inherit all of the permissions assigned to the junior
role. Therefore, the execution of this transformation rule will update the predicates within
Alloy code generated for the senior and junior roles with new assignment information.
More specifically, the predicates generated for the senior role will be injected with a new
permission into the role assignment information, while the predicate generated for the
junior roles will be injected with a new user into the role assignment information. For
example, The Role Hierarchy RH={rh(r1  r2), .........., } will inject the predicates within
Alloy code for Roles with new assignment information (i.e. rh(r1  r2)) will inject the
predicates generated for the roles r1 and r1 with new assignment information. There are
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two possible cases for the execution of this transformation rule.
Case 1 If a role is senior to another role/s and the junior role/s is not assigned to
any permission. There are two scenarios for this case. The first scenario occurs when
no user is assigned to the senior role. In this scenario, the predicates generated for the
senior and junior roles will not be updated. The second scenario involves a senior role
being assigned to one user or more. To describe this scenario, let us consider that role ri
is senior to role rj and senior role ri is assigned to user u1 at time t1 and at location l1.
Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13 depict the predicates generated for the senior role ri and the
junior role rj following transformation rules 2, 3 and 4.
Figure 4.12: Predicate for role ri Figure 4.13: Predicate for role rj
The execution of this transformation rule will only inject the predicate generated for
the junior role with new assignment information, as illustrated in Figure 4.14, while the
predicate for the senior role will not be updated. This happens because of the junior role
rj is not assigned to any permission, then the senior ri will not inherit any permission.
Figure 4.14: Updated predicate for junior role rj
Case 2 If a role is senior to another role/s and the junior role/s is assigned to one
permission or more. There are also two scenarios for this case. The first scenario occurs
when no user is assigned to the senior role. To describe this scenario, let us consider that
role ri is senior to role rj and junior role rj is assigned to permission p1 at time t1 and
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at location l1. Figure 4.15 and Figure 4.16 depict the predicates generated for the senior
role ri and the junior role rj following transformation rules 2, 3 and 4.
Figure 4.15: Predicate for role ri Figure 4.16: Predicate for role rj
The execution of this transformation rule will inject only the predicate generated for
the senior role with new assignment information, as illustrated in Figure 4.17, while the
predicate for the junior role will not be updated. This happens because the senior role is
not assigned to a user. Therefore, there will be no user to inherit the junior role and its
permissions.
Figure 4.17: Updated predicate for senior role ri
The second scenario occurs when one user or more is assigned to the senior role. To
describe this scenario, let us consider that role ri is senior to role rj, junior role rj is
assigned to permission p1 at time t1 and at location l1 and senior role ri is assigned to
user u1 at time t1 and at location l1. Figure 4.18 and Figure 4.19 depict the predicates
generated for the senior role ri and the junior role rj using transformation rules 2, 3 and
4.
Figure 4.18: Updated Predicate for role ri Figure 4.19: Updated Predicate for role rj
The execution of this transformation rule will inject the predicates generated for the
senior ri and the junior roles rj with new assignment information, as illustrated in Figure
4.20 and Figure 4.21.
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Figure 4.20: Updated Predicate for role ri Figure 4.21: Updated Predicate for role rj
4.3.6 Rule 6: Transformation of the Location Hierarchy to Alloy
(LH)
The transformation of the Location Hierarchy is similar to the transformation for Role
Hierarchy. This is because the Location Hierarchy between two locations, as described in
Section 3.1.4, means that if there is an assignment between a user and a role at the outer
location and at any point in time, then the same user can have the same role at the inner
location at the same point in time. Additionally, if there is an assignment between a role
and a permission at the outer location and at any point in time, then the same role can
have the same permission at the inner location and at the same point in time. As a result,
the transformation of the Location Hierarchy will update the predicates within the Alloy
code for roles with new assignment information, as depicted in Figure 4.2. In particular,
the execution of the transformation rule will inject the predicates generated for roles that
have a user to role assignment or a role to permission assignment at the outer location
with new assignment information. There are two possible cases for the execution of this
rule.
Case 1 If a location is an outer location in relation to another location/s and there
is a role/s that is assigned to a user/s or a permission/s at the outer location and at any
point in time. To describe this case, let us consider that location li is an outer location in
relation to location lj and role ri is assigned to user ui at the outer location and at time
ti. Figure 4.22 depicts the predicate generated for the role ri by following transformation
rules 2, 3, and 4. The execution of this transformation rule will inject the predicate
presented in Figure 4.22 with new assignment information, as depicted in Figure 4.23.
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Figure 4.22: Predicate for the role ri
Figure 4.23: Updated predicate for the role ri
Case 2 If a location is an outer location in relation to another location/s and there
is no assignment between roles and users or roles and permissions at the outer location.
In this case, the execution of this rule will have no effect on the Alloy code.
4.3.7 Rule 7: Transformation of Separation of Duty between
Roles to Alloy (SoDR)
The Separation of Duty between Roles (SoDR), as previously established, is a set of con-
straints over roles which specifies the exclusive set of roles. As depicted in Figure 4.2,
Separation of Duty between Roles is mapped into a predicate and checks in Alloy. In
particular, the Separation of Duty over Roles set SoDR={sodr(r1, r2, t1, l1), ......} is mapped
into a predicate in Alloy, and every element in the set of SoDR (i.e. sodr(r1, r2, t1, l1)) is
mapped into a check in Alloy, as depicted in Figure 4.24. These checks can be used later
to verify whether the SoDR constraints hold or do not hold. Here, we did not specify the
scope, since the Users, Roles, Permissions, Times and Locations signatures are specified
as abstract and their elements are specified as singleton.
Figure 4.24: Alloy code generated for SoDR
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4.3.8 Rule 8: Transformation of Separation of Duty between
Permission to Alloy (SoDP)
The Separation of Duty between Permission (SoDP), as previously established, is a set of
constraints over permissions which specifies the exclusive set of permissions. The trans-
formation of Separation of Duty between Permission is similar to the transformation of
Separation of Duty between Roles. In particular, the set of Separation of Duty between
Permissions SoDP={sodp(p1, p2, t1, l1), ......} is mapped into predicates in Alloy, and every ele-
ment in the set SoDP (i.e. sodp(p1, p2, t1, l1)) is mapped into a check in Alloy.
4.3.9 Rule 9: Transformation of Cardinality Constraint over
Roles (CCR)
As described in Section 3.1.7, the Cardinality Constraint over Roles (CCR) is a set of
constraints over roles which specifies the maximum number of users that can be assigned to
certain roles. As depicted in Figure 4.2, the set of Cardinality Constraints over Roles (CCR)
is mapped into checks in Alloy. More specifically, every element in the set of Cardinality
Constraints over Roles CCR={ccr(r1, t1, l1,m), ........}, i.e. ccr(r1, t1, l1,m), is mapped into a
check in Alloy, as depicted in Figure 4.25. These checks are used to verify whether the
CCR hold or do not hold. Here, once again, the scope has not been specified because the
Users, Roles, Permissions, Times and Locations signatures are specified as abstract and
their elements are specified as singleton.
Figure 4.25: Alloy code generated for CCR
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4.3.10 Rule 10: Transformation of Cardinality Constraints over
Permissions (CCP)
The CCP is a set of constraints which specifies the maximum number of roles that can be
assigned to certain permissions. The transformation of CCP is similar to the transformation
of CCR. As depicted in Figure 4.2, the set of Cardinality Constraints over Permissions (CCP)
is mapped into checks in Alloy. More specifically, every element in the set of Cardinality
Constraints over Permissions CCP={ccp(p1, t1, l1, n), ........} i.e ccp(p1, t1, l1, n) is mapped into
a check in Alloy, as depicted in Figure 4.2. These checks are used to verify whether the
CCP hold or do not hold.
4.4 Chapter Summary
Chapter 4 presented the model transformation AC2Alloy, which transforms the Access
Control specifications in the context of the STRBAC model into Alloy for the purpose
of analysis. In particular, this chapter first introduced the running example SECURE
Bank system, which is used to demonstrate our approach, and then described the set of
transformation rules that map the elements of the STRBAC model presented in Section
3.1 into Alloy. The model transformations presented in this chapter were implemented
in order to automate the creation of Alloy from the STRBAC models. In the following
chapter, we shall describe the implementation of our approach, which is developed as an
eclipse plug-in called AC2Alloy.
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CHAPTER 5
AC2ALLOY: IMPLEMENTATION OF A
TRANSFORMATION FRAMEWORK
This chapter will introduce the implementation of the transformation rules presented in
the previous chapter. The approach has been implemented as a plug-in called AC2Alloy.
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, we make use of the running
example presented in Section 4.1.
5.1 AC2Alloy Architecture
Figure 5.1 depicts an overview of the approach as described in the previous chapters. In
particular, a set of transformation rules has been defined to conduct the model transfor-
mation. The transformation rules map various elements of the STRBAC metamodel into
instances of the Alloy metamodel. These rules are then executed via the Simple Trans-
former (SiTra) transformation engine. Finally, the model transformation is implemented
as an eclipse plug-in application called AC2Alloy. If a STRBAC model is provided as
an input to AC2Alloy, an Alloy model is automatically generated as an output, following
which the produced Alloy model can be analysed using the Alloy analyser. The rest of
this section describes the implementation of AC2Alloy in more detail.
Figure 5.2 shows that AC2Alloy makes use of several distinct technologies. First of all,
the tool transforms the STRBAC specification, which is described in Section 3.1, to an
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Figure 5.1: Overview of the Approach
XML representation at the Eclipse GUI level. Secondly, it makes use of Java architecture
for XML Binding (JAXB) [117], which is an open source library for providing a fast and
convenient way to bind between XML schemas and Java representations, thus making
it easy for Java developers to incorporate XML data and processing functions in Java
applications. The JAXB library is used to take the XML [118] representation of the
STRBAC specification and to produce Java objects for the STRBAC specification. It then
makes use of the Simple Transformer (SiTra) to transform the Java objects generated for
the STRBAC to Alloy. Finally, the analysis of the generated Alloy model can be carried
out using the Alloy analyser.
Figure 5.2: Technologies used during the development of AC2Alloy
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5.1.1 XML for representing the STRBAC Model
Extensible Markup Language (XML) [118] is used to represent the STRBAC specification,
as described in the previous section. It is the technology of choice because it has the
following capabilities:
• Heterogeneity (Each record can hold different fields). This is necessary, as types
such as User Role Assignment will need to hold different fields such as User, Role,
Time and Location.
• Extensibility (New types of data can be added when needed). This is necessary, as
an Access Control model is likely to have many users, roles, times, locations and
permissions added.
• Flexibility (Fields can vary in size and configuration). This is necessary, as an
Access Control modelling one organisation will very likely be different to another
organisation.
• Can use XSD files to ensure that correctly conforming XML is used.
• It is used and understood worldwide.
• There are many useful programming libraries that use XML files for various opera-
tions that can be taken advantage of.
Figure 5.3 shows an instance of the XML file that represents the STRBAC specification
in the running example presented in Section 4.1.
5.1.2 Parsing XML Data into Java Objects
The parsing process, also known as syntax analysis, refers to analysing an input sequence
(read from a file or a keyboard, for example) in order to determine its grammatical struc-
ture with respect to a given formal grammar. In this case, parsing is required to transform
the XML data generated from the STRBAC model, which an instance of the XSD data
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<users>
<user user_id= "Dave "/>
<user user_id= "Hanna "/>
<user user_id= "Mark "/>
<user user_id= "Sarah "/>
</users>
Figure 5.3: XML for the set of Users
that represents the STRBAC metamodel into Java objects that could be manipulated by
SiTra. Parsing is performed using Java Architecture for XML Binding (JAXB) [117], a
technology that provides tooling to enable users to convert XML documents to and from
Java objects.
5.1.3 SiTra for Executing the Transformation Rules
Following on from the process of parsing the XML data into Java objects, the actual
model transformation process takes place. This process is conducted using the Simple
Transformer (SiTra), which is a Java library that provides a lightweight framework for
performing transformations. SiTra has become the technology of choice for executing
transformation rules because it is easy to use and is able to conduct complex transforma-
tions. As described in Chapter 2, SiTra consists of two interfaces, the rule interface and
the transformer interface. The rule interface should be implemented for each transfor-
mation rule written, while the transformer interface provides the framework of methods
that carry out the transformation. The rule interface consists of three methods: check(),
build() and setProperties(). If the rule is applicable for the source element in question,
the check() method of the rule implementation returns true and the build() method is
executed. The build() method generates the target model element. The setProperties()
is used to set the attributes and links for the newly created target element.
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5.2 AC2Alloy: An Eclipse Plug-in
The model transformation framework described in the previous chapters was implemented
as an eclipse plug-in called AC2Alloy. Figure 5.4 depicts a screen shot of the AC2Alloy
tool and shows that there are three panels. The left panel allows the user to add STRBAC
elements or to modify them accordingly. The middle panel produces an XML representa-
tion and readable English descriptions for the specification of the uploaded STRBAC and
also allows users to upload XML files. The third panel presents the automatic creation
of an Alloy model and also allows the user to modify the model, if needed, before the
analysis is applied.
Figure 5.4: Screen Shot of AC2Alloy
5.2.1 Consistency Statements that can be analysed using AC2Alloy
The AC2Alloy tool automatically generates several Alloy checks that can be used to
analyse the produced Alloy model. The following list highlights some examples of the
Alloy checks that will be generated using AC2Alloy for the purpose of analysis.
• Separation of Duty over Roles checks: these checks can be used to identify in-
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consistencies that might be caused due to interactions between Separation of Duty
between Roles, User Role Assignment, Role Hierarchy and Location Hierarchy rules.
• Separation of Duty over Permissions checks: these checks can be used to identify
inconsistencies that might be caused due to interactions between Separation of Duty
between permissions, User Role Assignment, Permission Role Acquire, Location
Hierarchy and Role Hierarchy rules.
• Cardinality Constraints checks: these checks can be used to identify inconsistencies
that might occur due to interactions between Cardinality Constraints, User Role
Assignment, Permission Role Acquire, Location Hierarchy and Role Hierarchy rules.
• User Role Assignment checks: these checks can be used to identify if a user (u)
is assigned to role (r) at time (t) and location (l), but he/she does not have any
permission at that point in time or at that location.
• Permission Role Acquire checks: these checks can be used to identify if a role (r)
is assigned to a permission (p) at time (t) and location (l), but the role (r) is not
assigned to any user at that point in time or at that location.
5.3 AC2Alloy in Practice
By interfacing with the Alloy analyser, the AC2Alloy implementation is able to analyse
the Access Control specification in the context of the STRBAC model. In this section,
the running example presented in Section 4.1 is used to demonstrate the feasibility of
our approach. In addition, a performance study is carried out in order to evaluate our
approach.
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5.3.1 Generating Alloy Model from the Running Example
In order to use AC2Alloy to auto-generate Alloy from the STRBAC specification in the
context of the running example of the SECURE bank system, the following steps will
be carried out. Firstly, the user or AC2Alloy should provide an AC2Alloy description
of the STRBAC specification of the SECURE bank system. Secondly, the STRBAC
specification should be transformed to an XML representation, which can then be saved
and transformed into an Alloy model, thus allowing for powerful analysis to be conducted
using the Alloy analyser.
Figure 5.5 depicts part of the Alloy code generated using AC2Alloy from the STRBAC
specification in the running example. The complete Alloy code for the running example
is presented in Appendix B.
abstract sig Users {}
one sig Dave, Sarah, Hanna, Mark extends Users {}
abstract sig Permissions {}
one sig RWTF, RWLF, RWAF, RWAMF extends Permissions {}
abstract sig Times {}
one sig DayTime, NightTime extends Times {}
abstract sig Locations {}
one sig office1, office2 extends Locations {}
abstract sig Role {time: lone Times,
location: lone Locations,
permissions: set Permissions,
users: set Users }
one sig Teller extends Role {}
fact TellerFactfall self:Teller {TellerCondition[self]}
pred TellerCondition[self:Teller]{((self.permissions= RWTF)&&
(self.location= Office2)&&(self.time= DayTime)&&
(self.users= Sarah))}
Figure 5.5: Part of the Alloy code for the SECURE bank system
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5.3.2 Model Analysis
Once the STRBAC specification in the context of the SECURE bank system has been
transformed into Alloy, we need to formally ensure that there are no inconsistencies or
semi-consistencies in the specification. We carry out this formal analysis using an Alloy
analyser. The generated Alloy model using AC2Alloy contains several Alloy checks to
detect inconsistencies and semi-consistencies in the specification. For example, the Sepa-
ration of Duty constraint between the roles Teller and Loan Officer in the SECURE bank
specification, as presented in Section 4.1.1, is mapped into the following Alloy formula.
pred SODR[r1, r2: Roles, l: Locations, t: Times]{
all u: Users |((u in r1.users) &&(t in r1.time)&&
(l in r1.location))=>((u not in r2.users)&&
(t in r2.time)&&(l in r2.location)) }
SoDR1 :check {
SODR[Taller, LoanOfficer, DayTime, Office2]}
Figure 5.6: Alloy formula for the SoD between Teller and Loan Officer
The execution of the Alloy check presented in Figure 5.6 shows that the Alloy analyser
picked up a counterexample, as depicted in Figure 5.7, which shows that the specification
is inconsistent because the two conflicting roles Teller and Loan Officer are assigned to
the same user Sarah during time DayTime and at the location Office2, due to the direct
user-to-role assignment. Therefore, in order to avoid this situation, the system designer
can remove either the assignment between the user Sarah and the role Loan Officer or
the role Teller during time DayTime at location Office2. The analysis was performed
without specifying the scope of the model, because the Users, Roles, Times and Loca-
tions signatures are specified as abstract and Teller, LoanOfficer, DayTime and Office2
signatures are specified as singleton.
Another similar example is that the Separation of Duty constraint between the roles
Accountant and Teller at the time DayTime and at location Office1 will be transformed into
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Figure 5.7: Counterexample for SoDR1 check: Inconsistency Detection
a check in Alloy as depicted in Figure 5.8.
SoDR2 :check {
SODR[Accountant, Taller, DayTime, Office1]}
Figure 5.8: Alloy formula for the SoD between Accountant and Teller
The execution of the above Alloy check shows that Alloy Analyser did not find a
counterexample as illustrated in Figure 5.9. This means that the Separation of Duty
constraint between the roles Accountant and Teller at the time DayTime and at location
Office1 satisfies all the other rules of the SECURE Bank specification presented in Section
4.1.1.
Figure 5.9: The result of the Execution of SoDR2 check
Another example of the Alloy checks, which will be generated using AC2Alloy, in order
to perform the analysis on the SECURE bank system, is that the cardinality constraint
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over the Accountant role during time DayTime and at location Office1 is mapped into the
following Alloy formula. The following constraint means that the Accountant role can be
assigned to only one user during time DayTime and at location Office1.
CC1 :check {((Office1 in Accountant.location)&&
(DayTime in Accountant.time)=>(#Accountant.user <2))}
Figure 5.10: Alloy Formula for the Cardinality Constraint over the Accountant role
The execution of the above Alloy checks shows that the Alloy analyser picked up a
counterexample, as depicted in Figure 5.11, which shows that the specification is incon-
sistent because more than one user (Mark and Hanna) is assigned to the Accountant role,
which is not permissible according to the Cardinality constraint over the Accountant role.
The Accountant role is assigned to the user Hanna because of the direct assignment using
User Role Assignment, while it is assigned to the user Mark because Mark is assigned to
the role Accounting Manager during time DayTime and at location Office1, which is senior
to the junior Accountant role. Therefore, in order to avoid this situation, the system de-
signer should modify the specification by removing either the assignment between the user
Hanna and the Accountant role during time DayTime and at location Office1 or the hierarchy
between the roles Accounting Manager and Accountant during time DayTime and at location
Office1. Here also, the analysis was performed without specifying the scope of the model
because the Users, Roles, Times and Locations signatures are specified as abstract and
Accountant, DayTime and Office1 signatures are specified as singleton. The
Figure 5.11: Counterexample for CC1 check: Inconsistency Detection
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5.4 Chapter Summary
In this Chapter we presented the implementation of the model transformation AC2Alloy.
The description of AC2Alloy architecture and the technologies used in the development of
AC2Alloy are discussed in Section 5.1. We followed this by providing a description of the
eclipse plug-in AC2Alloy. We also described several types of consistency statements that
could be analysed using AC2Alloy. In section 5.3 we described the usage of AC2Alloy
for modelling and analysing Access Control specifications to ensure the consistency of the
specifications.
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CHAPTER 6
AC2UPPAAL: TRANSFORMATION BETWEEN
THE STRBAC MODEL, TIMED AUTOMATA AND
TCTL
In this chapter we describe a new model transformation framework called AC2Uppaal
which transforms the Access Control specification in the context of the STRBAC model
into Timed Automata and Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL) statements. The
Timed Automata network and TCTL statements can then be modelled and verified using
the Uppaal model checker to detect conflicts in the STRBAC specification. To conduct
the model transformation, this chapter describes a set of transformation rules that have
been defined to map the elements of the STRBAC, Timed Automata and TCTL. This
is followed by an explanation about the implementation and performance of the model
transformation with the help of the running example presented in Section 4.1.
6.1 AC2Uppaal: Model Transformation
AC2Uppaal is a tool that makes use of Model-Driven Architecture (MDA) techniques for
integrating the STRBAC, Timed Automata and Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL)
into a single tool. It enables the user to create STRBAC specifications and transforms
them into XML representation. The XML representation of the STRBAC model is then
automatically transformed into Timed Automata and TCTL statements. The produced
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Timed Automata and TCTL statements will be modelled and verified using the Uppaal
model checker to detect conflicts in the STRBAC specification. The model transformation
process is hereby described in the following three stages:
• Metamodels for the source and the target models.
• Transformation rules to map the elements of the STRBAC and Alloy.
• Implementation of the transformation rules.
As described in Section 4.2, conducting a model transformation requires metamodels for
the source and the target to be constructed to specify the elements of the source model that
will be mapped to the elements of the target model. The source’s metamodel, STRBAC,
has already been defined in the previous chapters. The metamodels of the target, Timed
Automata and TCTL on the other hand are declared in Java. In Section 2.4 we presented
a Timed Automata metamodel which included most of the elements that will be used in
our mapping.
6.2 Transformation Rules
In this section, we introduce the transformation rules that we have defined to map the
elements of the STRBAC to Timed Automata and TCTL. The transformation of the
STRBAC to Timed Automata and TCTL is divided into two phases. The first phase
transforms some of the STRBAC’s features, such as times and users, into Timed Au-
tomata, while the second phase generates TCTL statements from STRBAC features such
as Permission Role Acquire. With the help of the running example discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1, we describe how various features of the STRBAC model are mapped to Timed
Automata and TCTL statements.
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6.2.1 Phase 1: Mapping STRBAC features to Timed Automata
The process of transforming some features of the STRBAC model to Timed Automata
(TA) involves two kinds of Timed Automata. The first describes the cycle of times defined
in the set of times, while the second describes the set of users and the user role assignment
information.
6.2.1.1 Producing a Timed Automaton that captures STRBAC times and
their evolution
The set of times, which is one of the basic components of the STRBAC model, is mapped
to a Timed Automaton (TA) called ‘Times’. For example, if a given set of Times i.e.
Times={t1, t2, ......tm} is mapped, then the execution of the transformation rule will pro-
duce a Timed Automaton called ‘Times’, as described in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Timed Automaton for Times
For example, in the SECURE bank system the set of times is divided into two periods
DayTime – from 9:00 to 16:00 – and NightTime – from 16:00 to 9:00. These data are
transformed into a Timed Automaton called ‘Times’, as depicted in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: Timed Automaton for Times in the SECURE bank specification
6.2.2 Transforming the STRBAC Users and User Role Assign-
ment information to a Timed Automaton
The process of transforming the Set of Users and User Role Assignment information
into a Timed Automaton involve the following two steps. Step 1: for every user in
the Users set we create a Timed Automaton (TA). For example, every user in the set
of Users={u1, u2, ......., un} (i.e. u1) will be transformed into a Timed Automata called
u1, as depicted in Figure 6.3. Each TA must represent the activities of the user in the
locations at each point in time. The worst scenario will be if we have m times and k
locations, in which case we will have m × k Timed Automata locations, which is the
other term used for the states. At each location (i.e. lj) time can pass, as a result the
Timed Automata locations of the form (t1, lj), (t2, lj), ...., (tm, lj) follow each other as time
progress. The edges that connect one Timed Automata location (state) to another are
called transitions, as illustrated in Figure 6.3. Each Timed Automata location has a role
switch which corresponds to an element of User Role Assignment. If a Timed Automata
location has a role switch {label=true}, then each edge coming into the Timed Automata
location and going out from the Timed Automata location without the same label has
an updated expression label=true, while if a Timed Automata location has a role switch
{label=false}, then each edge coming into the Timed Automata location and going out
from the Timed Automata location without the same label has an updated expression
label=false. For example, if user u1 is assigned to role r at time tj and location lk, which
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represent the Timed Automata location (tj, lk), this means that the Timed Automata
location (tj, lk) has a role switch {r=true}, while if user u is not assigned to role r at the
Timed Automata location (tm, lk), then state (tm, lk) has a role switch r=false, as depicted
in Figure 6.3.
Step 2: the aim of this step is to enhance the generated Timed Automaton from the
first step to capture the new User Role Assignment information which will be generated
because of the Role Hierarchy. As described in Section 3.1.3, Role Hierarchy means that
a user who has a senior role can inherit junior roles and all permissions assigned to those
roles, and the senior role can inherit all the permissions assigned to the junior roles, too.
This means that new User Role Assignment and Permission Role Acquire functions will
be added to the specification. Therefore, the new User Role Assignment information will
be used to update the Timed Automaton generated for users, while the new Permission
Role Acquire information will be transformed into TCTL in the second phase of the
transformation. For example, if role r is senior to role r′ and role r is assigned to user
u1 at state (tj, lk), then the same user u1 will have junior role r
′ at the same state, as
depicted in Figure 6.3.
For example, a Timed Automaton will be generated for every user in the set of Users
in the SECURE bank system presented in Section 4.1. The Timed Automaton generated
for every user captures all the User Role Assignment information related to that user.
For instance, a Timed Automaton will be generated for user Mark, as depicted in Figure
6.4. This Timed Automata captures the User Role Assignment information (i.e. (Mark,
Accounting Manager, DayTime, Office1)) presented in Table 4.1, which is related to the user
Mark.
The Timed Automata generated for every user also captures User Role Assignment in-
formation, which is generated because of Role Hierarchy. For example, the following Role
Hierarchy in the SECURE bank specification (Accounting Manager, Accountant, DayTime,
Office1) means that user Mark, who has the senior role Accounting Manager during the
DayTime and at Office1, based on Table 4.1, can inherit the junior Accountant role. The
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Figure 6.3: Timed Automata generated for the user u1
new user-to-role assignment information (Mark, Accountant, DayTime, Office1) will be ex-
pressed using a Timed Automaton. More precisely, the Timed Automaton for user Mark
depicted in Figure 6.4 will be updated with new assignment information, as illustrated in
Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.4: Timed Automaton for Mark
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Figure 6.5: Updated Timed Automaton for Mark
6.2.3 Phase 2: Mapping STRBAC features into TCTL
Some features of the STRBAC model, such as Permission Role Acquire and Separation
of Duty between Permissions, will be expressed using TCTL, and then they will be used
as sub-expressions of queries for Timed Automata.
6.2.3.1 Transforming Permission Role Acquire to TCTL Statements
The Permission Role Acquire (PRA) set will be mapped to TCTL statements. More
specifically, every element in the PRA set will be transformed into TCTL statements. For
example, every element in PRA={pra(r1, p1, t1, l1), ......., ura(ro, px, tm, lk)} will be transformed
into a TCTL statement, i.e. pra(r1, p1, t1, l1) will be transformed into a TCTL statement
as illustrated in Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.6: TCTL statement for Permission Role Acquire
This means any user u in the set of Users who has role r1 at time t1 and at location
l1 can have permission p1 at the same time t1 and at the same location l1.
For example, the first element of Permissions Role Acquire presented in Table 4.2
(Teller, Read Write Teller File (RWTF), DayTime, Office2) will be expressed using TCTL
as depicted in Figure 6.7.
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RWTF(u):=u.DayTime_Office2 & u.Teller
RWTF:=$\bigvee_{u \in Users}$ RWTF$(u)$
Figure 6.7: TCTL Statements for the Permissions Role Acquire
This means any user u in the set of Users who is a Teller can have permission Read and
Write Teller File, where Users is a finite set, so that we can have a finite expression of
RWTF. In the SECURE bank system we have a finite set of Users consisting of the following
four users: Dave, Sarah, Mark and Hanna. This will result in a finite set of RWTF expressions
as follows:
RWTF:=Dave.Daytime_Office2 & Dave.Teller
|| Sarah.DayTime_Office2 & Sarah.Teller
|| Hanna.DayTime_Office2 & Mark.Teller
|| Mark.DayTime_Office2 & Hanna.Teller
Figure 6.8: An Example of a TCTL Statement for the Permission Role Acquire in the
SECURE Bank System
The other elements of the Permission Role Acquire presented in Table 4.2 can be
transformed into TCTL statements in the same way.
6.2.3.2 Transforming Role Hierarchy to TCTL Statements
As described in Section 6.2.2, new User Role Assignment and Permission Role Acquire
will be added to the specification due to the effect of Role Hierarchy. The new User
Role Assignment information will update the Timed Automata generated for users, as
illustrated in Section 6.2.2, while the new Permission Role Acquire information will be
expressed using TCTL. The new Permission Role Acquire can be transformed into TCTL,
as described in Section 6.2.3.1.
For example, in the SECURE bank system the following Role Hierarchy (Accounting
Manager, Accountant, DayTime, Office1) means that the senior role Accounting Manager can
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inherit all the permissions assigned to the junior role Accountant, such as RWAF during
the DayTime and at Office1. The new Permission Role Acquire information (Accounting
Manager, RWAF, DayTime, Office1) will be represented using TCTL, as shown in Figure 6.9.
RWAF2(u):= u.DayTime_Office1 & u.AccountingManager
RWAF2:= $\bigvee_{u \in Users}$ RWAF2$(u)$
Figure 6.9: TCTL Statement generated due to the effect of Role Hierarchy
6.2.3.3 Transforming Separation of Duty between Roles into TCTL State-
ments
The Separation of Duty between Roles can also be expressed using TCTL. For example,
every element in the Separation of Duty between Roles set SoDR={sodr(r1, r2, t1, l1), .......}
will be transformed into a TCTL statement, i.e. sodr(r1, r2, t1, l1) will be transformed into
the following TCTL statement:
Figure 6.10: TCTL Statement for the Separation of Duty between Roles
The TCTL statement presented in Figure 6.10 means that there no user should be in
the set of Users with role r1 and role r2 at time t1 and at location l1.
For example, in the SECURE bank system the following Separation of Duty between
Roles (Teller, Loan Officer, DayTime, Office2) will be expressed using TCTL, as illus-
trated in Figure 6.11.
This means that no user should be in the set of Users that has the two conflicting
roles Teller and Loan Officer during DayTime and at Office2.
Another similar example is that the Separation of Duty constraint between the roles
(Accountant, Teller, DayTime, Office1) will be transformed into TCTL statement as il-
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SoDR1:=And_{u \in Users}(u.DayTime_Office2
implies NOT (u.Teller & u.LoanOfficer))
Figure 6.11: TCTL Statement for the SoD between Teller and LoanOfficer
lustrated in Figure 6.12.
SoDR2:=And_{u \in Users}(u.DayTime_Office1
implies NOT (u.Accountant & u.Teller))
Figure 6.12: TCTL Statement for the SoD between Accountant and Teller
The TCTL statement depicted in Figure 6.12 means that there should be no user
in the set of Users that can have the two conflicting roles Accountant and Teller during
DayTime and at Office1.
6.3 Implementation of the Model transformation
In this section we describe the process of implementing the transformation rules presented
in Section 6.2 as an eclipse plug-in called AC2Uppaal.
6.3.1 AC2Uppaal Architecture
Our work is motivated by the need to bridge the gap between the STRBAC model and the
formal Timed Automata method, in order to allow for powerful analysis to be carried out.
Figure 6.13 depicts an overview of our approach to automate the transformation between
the STRBAC, Timed Automata and TCTL based on Model-Driven Architecture (MDA).
More precisely, the STRBAC metamodel is mapped into the Timed Automata and TCTL
metamodels using a number of transformation rules which are then executed using SiTra
and implemented as an eclipse plug-in called AC2Uppaal. If an instance of the STRBAC
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metamodel is provided as an input, an equivalent Timed Automata network and TCTL
statements are generated. The produced Timed Automata and the TCTL statement can
be modelled and analysed using the Uppaal model checker.
Figure 6.13: Outline of the Approach
The process of generating Timed Automata and TCTL statements from STRBAC
models was achieved in the following manner:
• Formalisation of the STRBAC specification. This step has been discussed in Section
3.1.
• Defining a set of transformation rules to map the elements of the STRBAC, Timed
Automata and TCTL.
• Representing the STRBAC specification using XML. This step has been described
in Section 5.1.1.
• Parsing the XML data into Java objects. This has been discussed in Section 5.1.2.
• Using the Simple Transformer (SiTra) to execute the transformation rules presented
in Section 6.2.
• Implementing the model transformation as an eclipse plug-in, so that if a STRBAC
model is provided as an input, an equivalent Timed Automata and TCTL will be
produced.
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6.3.2 AC2Uppaal: An Eclipse Plug-in
The model transformation framework described in the previous sections was implemented
as an eclipse plug-in called AC2Uppaal. Figure 6.14 depicts a screen shot of the tool
and shows that there are three panels. The left panel allows the user to add STRBAC
elements or to modify them. The middle panel produces an XML representation and
readable English descriptions for the specification of the uploaded STRBAC and also
allows users to upload XML files. The third panel presents the automatic creation of
Timed Automata and TCTL and also allows the user to modify both of them, if needed,
before the analysis is applied using the Uppaal model checker.
Figure 6.14: Screen Shot of AC2Uppaal
6.3.3 AC2Uppaal in Practice
Interfacing with the Uppaal model checker, the method presented in this chapter is able
to analyse the STRBAC specification. Using case studies is one of the most appropri-
ate techniques for evaluating software engineering frameworks and tools, so the running
example presented in Section 4.1 is used to demonstrate the feasibility of our approach.
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6.3.3.1 Model Analysis
In the previous sections, we illustrated how various elements of the STRBAC model are
transformed into Timed Automata and TCTL statements, and the graphical representa-
tion of the Timed Automaton as well as the TCTL statements are presented in Appendix
C. However, this work would be incomplete without demonstrating how we can analyse the
produced Timed Automata models to detect inconsistencies. To ensure the consistency
of the SECURE bank system the AC2Uppaal tool will automatically generate several
security queries using TCTL. For example, the tool generates the TCTL query shown
in Figure 6.15, which is built from the TCTL statements which are generated using the
transformation rules presented in Sections 6.2.3.1, 6.2.3.2 and 6.2.3.3.
A[] ((RWTF & RWLF & RWAF & RWBMF &
RWAMF & RWAF2) implies SoDR1)
Figure 6.15: An Example of the TCTL Queries Generated to Analyse the Specification
The TCTL query in Figure 6.15 means that if all the Permission Role Acquire and the
Role Hierarchy statements such as RWTF, RWLF, RWAF, RWBMF, RWAMF and RWAF2, which are
generated using the transformation rules presented in Section 6.2.3.1 and Section 6.2.3.2,
hold, then the SoDR1 statement which is generated using the transformation rule presented
in Section 6.2.3.3 should also hold for any time and location configuration. This security
query and the produced Timed Automata network were implemented using the Uppaal
model checker to identify conflicts in the SECURE bank specification. The execution
of the Uppaal verifier found that the property was not satisfied, as depicted in Figure
6.16. This means that the SECURE bank system is inconsistent, because the Uppaal
model checker has found that the two conflicting roles Teller and Loan Officer have been
assigned by the same user Sarah during time DayTime and at location Office2, which is not
permissible according to the SoDR. In order to avoid such a situation, the designer should
modify the specification by removing either the assignment between the user Sarah and
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the role Teller during time DayTime at location Office2 or the same user Sarah and role
Loan Officer during time DayTime at location Office2.
Figure 6.16: UPPAAL Analysis Result
Another example of the TCTL queries that will be generated by the tool AC2Uppaal
is illustrated in Figure 6.17. This TCTL query means that if all the Permission Role
Acquire and the Role Hierarchy statements such as RWTF, RWLF, RWAF, RWBMF, RWAMF and
RWAF2, which are generated using the transformation rules presented in Section 6.2.3.1 and
Section 6.2.3.2, hold, then the SoDR2 statement which is generated using the transformation
rule presented in Section 6.2.3.3 should also hold at time DayTime and location Office1.
A[] ((RWTF & RWLF & RWAF & RWBMF &
RWAMF & RWAF2) implies SoDR2)
Figure 6.17: An Example of the TCTL Queries Generated to Analyse the Specification
The execution of the model checker Uppaal found that the property was satisfied, as
depicted in Figure 6.18. This means that the SoDR2 satisfies all the rules of the SECURE
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Bank system. More precisely, this means that the model checker Uppaal did not find any
user that has the two conflicted roles, Accountant and Teller, at the time DayTime and at
the location Office1.
Figure 6.18: UPPAAL Analysis Result
6.4 Chapter Summary
Chapter 6 presented the model transformation AC2Uppaal, which transforms the Access
Control Specifications in the context of the STRBAC model into Timed Automata and
TCTL statements for the purpose of analysis. Section 6.1 provided an introduction of the
model transformation AC2Uppaal. The transformation rules that map the elements of
the STRBAC model into Timed Automata and TCTL statements are discussed in Section
6.2. Section 6.3 described the implementation of the model transformation AC2Uppaal
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and discussed the usage of AC2Uppaal for modelling and analysing Access Control spec-
ifications to ensure the consistency of the specifications.
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CHAPTER 7
COMPARISON OF ALLOY AND TIMED
AUTOMATA FOR ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEMS
In this Chapter we perform a comparative study of formal Alloy and Timed Automata
specifications from capability and performance points of view. In particular, this Chap-
ter presents a comparison between Alloy and Timed Automata for modelling and the
analysis of Access Control specifications in the context of Spatio-Temporal Role Based
Access Control, in order to evaluate the integration methods presented in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6. The comparison study is based on the SECURE bank system case study,
which is presented in Section 4.1. In order to compare the performance of Alloy against
Timed Automata, the Access Control specification of the SECURE bank system must be
translated into Alloy and Timed Automata. To achieve this goal, we make use of the two
model transformations AC2Alloy and AC2Uppaal presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6,
respectively.
7.1 Capability
A capability study is carried out to determine whether our approaches are capable of
modelling and performing an analysis of the specifications for the Access Control in the
context of the STRBAC model. In particular, the study aims at answering the following
two questions:
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• Is the modelling language capable of modelling the specifications for the Access
Control model?
• Is the method capable of checking a sufficient number of constraints for the Access
Control specification?
7.1.1 Capability of modelling STRBAC specifications
To answer the first question, Table 7.1 presents the STRBAC specifications that we were
able to model using our AC2Alloy and AC2Uppaal approaches. In particular, it shows
that not all the STRBAC features (i.e. Location Hierarchy and Cardinality Constraints)
that we modelled in Alloy using AC2Alloy were modelled in Timed Automata and TCTL
using AC2Uppaal. It is however possible to model them in Timed Automata. For example,
the Location Hierarchy can be transformed into Timed Automata and TCTL in a similar
way to the transformation of Role Hierarchy presented in Section 6.2.2. This is possible
because new User Role Assignment information and Permission Role Acquire will be
generated due to the effect of Location Hierarchy and the Role Hierarchy, as described in
Section 3.1.3 and Section 3.1.4. Extending our method AC2Uppaal to include elements
such as Location Hierarchy and Cardinality Constraints remains for future research.
Table 7.1: Modelling the STRBAC model using Alloy and Timed Automata
STRBAC Specification Alloy Timed Automata+TCTL
User Role Assignment
√ √
Permission Role Acquire
√ √
Role Hierarchy
√ √
Location Hierarchy
√ ×
Separation of Duty between Roles
√ √
Separation of Duty between Permissions
√ √
Cardinality Constraints over Roles
√ ×
Cardinality Constraints over Permissions
√ ×
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7.1.2 Capability of Checking Constraints of STRBAC specifica-
tions
Evaluating the capability of Alloy and Timed Automata to check STRBAC specification
constraints is an important task. Therefore, we shall next discuss some of the advantages
and disadvantages of using Alloy and Timed Automata for checking STRBAC specification
constraints. Firstly, Alloy is supported by an automated tool called Alloy Analyser. Alloy
Analyser is an automated constraint solver that transforms the Alloy code into Boolean
expressions, providing the analysis by its embedded SAT solvers. This kind of constraint
solver works by finding models that form counterexamples to assertions made by the user.
Alloy is capable of checking most of the constraints presented in Section 3.2; however,
it has some limitations with respect to the types of verification it can perform. One
of the major limitation of Alloy is that, analysing and understanding the behaviour of
systems using Alloy is non-trivial. For example currently, it is not possible to use Alloy to
check whether an activated role will eventually be deactivated, which is because models in
Alloy are static. As a further example, Alloy models capture the entities of a system, their
relationships and constraints within the system. An Alloy analyser defines an instance
of a system where the constraints are satisfied. More specifically, Alloy does not have
any built-in notion of state [20]. Therefore, modelling of scenarios involving a number
of states and evolution is not trivial. However, recent advances in dynamic Alloy might
allow such modelling [124], but this is an area for future research.
Another major limitation of Alloy is scope. An Alloy user needs to specify the scope
prior to performing an analysis. When the user executes the commands that he/she wants
to check, the Alloy Analyser will search for counterexamples. If Alloy Analyser returns
a counterexample is found, this means the model is inconsistent, while if the analyser
returns no counterexample is found, this means either a counterexample may still exist
in a larger scope and the model is not consistent or there is no counterexample and the
model is consistent [21].
Timed Automata is a well-established model for representing real-time systems because
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it is adequate enough to represent systems and is supported by temporal logic, which is
a popular formalism for expressing system properties. Timed Automata and temporal
logic can be analysed automatically with several well-known and mature model checkers,
such as Uppaal. In addition, Timed Automata have a notion of state and evolution
from one state to another. In Timed Automata the reachability problem is decidable
[24]. Reachability helps to decide whether a certain state in a system is reachable from
a given initial state. Therefore, Timed Automata can be a better choice for modelling
and analysing liveness queries. In [80, 81], Mandol et al. show how to verify liveness
queries using Timed Automata. For example, this work illustrates that it is possible to
check whether or not a deactivated role will be activated eventually. Moreover, Timed
Automata is also capable of checking most of the inconsistencies presented in Section 3.2.
As a result, it is clear that Timed Automata has greater advantages from the capability
point of view.
7.2 Performance
In this section we evaluate the performance between Alloy and Timed Automata in terms
of time required to complete an analysis. In order to evaluate the performance of Alloy for
an analysis of STRBAC specifications against Timed Automata, we only take the STR-
BAC elements that can be handled by the AC2Alloy and AC2Uppaal tools, as depicted
in Table 7.1. In this case, AC2Alloy and AC2Uppaal are used to transform the Access
Control specification of the SECURE bank system into Alloy and Timed Automata, re-
spectively. This is followed by using the Alloy analyser to analyse the generated Alloy
model and the Uppaal model checker to verify the Timed Automata. In the meantime,
the time required to complete the analysis using the Alloy analyser and Uppaal has been
computed. This process is repeated five times. To be more accurate, the test is repeated
five times for every method. Every time the number of one of the STRBAC elements
(Users, Roles, User Role Assignment, Permission Role Acquire and Role Hierarchy) is
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increased gradually, while the other elements are kept fixed. The results are depicted
as line charts in Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5, which represents the time required to
complete the analysis (in milliseconds) of all STRBAC elements.
The machine used in this test had the following configuration: HP Laptop running
Windows 7 on an AMD Athlon(tm)x2 dual-core ql-64 2.10 GHZ with 3GB RAM. Time
spent was calculated in milliseconds (ms).
Figure 7.1: Increasing the number of Users Figure 7.2: Increasing the number of Roles
A general observation from the line charts depicted in Figures 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 is
that increasing the elements in the STRBAC model increases the time required to com-
plete the analysis and has different effects on the time required to complete the analysis.
For example, on one hand, it is noteworthy that increasing the number of roles increases
the time required to complete analysis using Alloy more than any other element in the
STRBAC model. We speculate the reason for this is because every role is transformed
into a signature, fact and predicate in Alloy based on our transformation rules. This
means the number of variables and clauses which will be created by the SAT-solver for
every role is larger than the number of variables and clauses which will be created by the
SAT-solver for any other elements such as user or permission. As a consequence, when the
number of roles is increased by N number, the time spent on analysis will be longer than
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Figure 7.3: Increasing the number of URA Figure 7.4: Increasing the number of PRA
Figure 7.5: Increasing the number of RH
the time spent when any other elements of the STRBAC increase by the same number N .
This is because the Alloy analyser is SAT-solver-based and SAT-solving time may vary
enormously depending on factors such as clause ordering, the number of variables and the
average length of clauses [119].
On the other hand, it is noticeable from the line charts that increasing the number of
Role Hierarchy increases the time spent completing the analysis using Timed Automata
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more than any other element in the STRBAC model. We speculate the reason for this is
because the transformation of every Role Hierarchy will add new information to the Timed
Automata and the TCTL because a new User Role Assignment (URA) and Permission
Role Acquire will be generated and added to the specification.
In conclusion, as expected, the time required to complete verification increases gradu-
ally as more elements are added to the STRBAC specification. However, Timed Automata
seems to perform better than Alloy in this sense, which shows that Timed Automata is
a slightly better performer, as it completes the analysis of the five scenarios faster than
Alloy, especially when the size of the specification is very large. For more information
relating to the numerical values of the performances of Alloy and Timed Automata, please
refer to Appendix D and Appendix E.
7.3 Chapter Summary
This Chapter presented a comparative study between Alloy and Timed Automata from
the capability and performance point of view. The comparison study aimed to evaluate
the methods Alloy and Timed Automata for modelling and analysing of Access Control
specifications in the context of STRBAC model. This study has thrown up many questions
in need of further investigation. Firstly, further experimental investigations are needed to
establish complexity of checking inconsistency in our analysis.
It would be also interesting to know about the behaviour of the graphs when we move
to larger examples with 1000 or 10000 elements. This is because the graphs are not giving
a clear picture. Therefore, future research should concentrate on the investigation of using
stronger machines to run larger Access Control examples in orders of magnitude larger.
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CHAPTER 8
EXTENDING THE SPATIO-TEMPORAL ROLE
BASED ACCESS CONTROL MODEL FOR
PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Our preliminary investigation revealed the following. Researchers have proposed sev-
eral Spatio-Temporal Access Control models, such as Spatio-Temporal Role Based Ac-
cess Control (STRBAC), to support policy designers in designing proper Access Control
specifications, especially the Cyber Access Control (CAC) specification. Although these
models offer many benefits for implementing CAC systems, they are not adequate enough
to represent Physical Access Control (PAC) specifications and still have some limitations
that should be overcome prior to modelling the physical aspect of Access Control. One of
the major drawbacks to these models is the representation of locations, as current models
deal with logical location, which may not be suitable for representing the physical aspect
of Access Control. This is a critical point, because logical location and physical location
are different, especially when dealing with hierarchy. We came across such limitations
when trying to model a PAC mechanism used in a leading telecommunications company
(British Telecom).
Physical Access Control (PAC) is as important as Cyber Access Control (CAC) be-
cause physical access to resources such as computers, servers and network cables may
allow for bypassing the CAC mechanism. Therefore, it is important to develop a new
model that can support the physical aspect of Access Control, in order to reduce the
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complexity of security management. As a result of our study of different Access Control
models, we decided to extend the existing models to overcome their limitations, in order
to be capable of modelling Physical Access Control (PAC) specifications. Our model ex-
tends that proposed by Ray and Toahchoode [12] and consists of various rules that can
be employed to support various system requirements. These rules may interact with each
other in subtle ways and result in inconsistencies, which must be detected before the im-
plementation of the system. Therefore, we make use of the method presented in Chapter
5, AC2Alloy, to ensure the consistency of the specification. In order to demonstrate the
feasibility of our approach, we make use of a case study provided by our industrial partner
British Telecom (BT).
The rest of this chapter is divided as follows. In Section 8.1 we provide an overview
of Physical Access Control (PAC) systems. In Section 8.2 a case study provided by
our industrial partner British Telecom (BT) is introduced. Section 8.3 addresses the
limitations of the current STRBAC model. Section 8.4 presents our efforts to develop the
new STRBAC-PS framework, and in Section 8.5 we make use of the method presented in
Chapter 5, AC2Alloy, to transform the specification of the case study into Alloy language,
after which an Alloy analyser is used to analyse the specification.
8.1 Physical Access Control (PAC) System
In physical security, the term ‘Access Control’ refers to the practice of restricting entrance
to a property, a building or a room to authorised persons. Physical Access Control (PAC)
can be achieved by a human (a guard, bouncer or receptionist) through mechanical means
such as locks and keys, or through technological means such as physical Access Control
systems (e.g. a card reader). Figure 8.1 illustrates an example of PAC systems. In a large
organisation such as BT, which deals with physical and cyber infrastructures, managing
Physical Access Control (PAC) policies is a complex task. The complexity is mainly
attributable to the following five aspects:
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Figure 8.1: Physical Access Control System
• A large number of buildings/zones with distributed geo-locations.
• Buildings with different risk levels which require different levels of Access Control.
• A mixture of users who have access to buildings based on a mix of roles such as
permanent employees, contractors, third parties and outsourcing workforce.
• Time constraints for accessing the building/zones. For example, certain zones can
be accessed during the day, while at the night they are locked.
• Physical access can invalidate cyber access. For example, if a machine is protected
by a firewall but people can physically access it, then they can access the hard disk
and copy it. This can be done by, for example, mounting the hard drive via an OS
which is on a memory stick.
Considering the above factors, a typical PAC system for a large organisation should be
able to assess a combination of risk levels regarding buildings/zones, personal roles, time
and location. As a result, such models can be very complex.
An example of PAC is as follows:
• A user swipes an ID card to submit his or her user profile to the system to verify
the user’s information. The user profile contains user information such as the roles
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that are assigned to him or her.
• The card reader reveals which building or zone the user is accessing, and therefore
it submits the user profile and building profile to the system. The building/zone
profile contains the building/zone’s risk level information for Access Control.
• Both profiles (user profile and building profile) are processed by the Physical Access
Control (PAC) system. The process involves a rule engine that has knowledge of the
physical access policies. It compares the two profiles and makes an access decision.
• Three possible results (access, cannot access or access without approval) can be
returned by the Access Control process. If it returns ”access without approval”,
then the system will look for registered approvals in the user profile for the required
zone, in order to decide whether access should be granted or denied. If the rule
engine returns ”cannot access”, then Access Control is denied.
During the process of granting access, time and location are also important factors. For
example, if a user tries to access a building/zone outside his/her working hours or in
a different geographical location from his/her normal working region, access may not be
granted. For example, if a user who is an Essex-based cabling engineer tries to gain access
to a cable chamber in Edinburgh, access may be denied, as it is out of his/her working
region. However, if there are pre-registered approvals or special events, such as a meeting,
emergency repair or disaster recovery, then access can still be granted.
8.2 Case Study: Physical Access Control System
In this section we introduce a simplified version of a Physical Access Control (PAC)
example used in a large telecommunications company to demonstrate our approach.
111
8.2.1 Physical System Security Policies
8.2.1.1 Entity
In organisations such as telecommunications companies, users are mainly categorised
based on their job type, for example Company Employees, Technical Employees, Clerical
Employees, and Cabling Engineer. These organisations are also based in several regions
(i.e. Birmingham region, Manchester Region), every one of which consists of several build-
ings such as x, y, z , which contain several zones or rooms such as server rooms and
common rooms. Each physical Access Control point (e.g a card reader) can be considered
a zone or a room entrance. In this thesis, we assume that the organisation is based in
one region (Birmingham Region) and it only works out of one building (x ) which contains
three zones: the Low Risk Zone, Medium Risk Zone and High Risk Zone, as depicted in
Figure 8.2. The organisation also employs thousands of users. Dave, Mark, Tom, Sarah,
Figure 8.2: Location
Amy and Hannah represent a small list of users within the organisation chosen to illustrate
our approach. Examples of the permissions available to users are listed in Table 8.1. Each
user from the above list could be assigned to roles in the organisation based on the time
and location constraints illustrated in Table 8.2, and each role can be assigned to the
permissions based on the time and location constraints summarised in Table 8.3.
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Table 8.1: List of Permissions
Permission
P1 Access Building x
P2 Access Low-level zone (i.e. common room)
P3 Access Medium-level zone (i.e. data centre)
P4 Access High-level zone (i.e. server room)
P5 Access Street Cabinets
Table 8.2: Users to Roles Assignment Constraints
Users Roles Times Locations
Dave Cabling Engineer DayTime L5: street cabinets Birmingham Region
L2: Low Risk Zone Birmingham Region
Sarah Cabling Engineer DayTime L5: street cabinets Birmingham Region
L2: Low Risk Zone Birmingham Region
Tom Cabling Engineer DayTime L5: street cabinets Birmingham Region
L2: Low Risk Zone Birmingham Region
Amy Technical Engineer DayTime L3: High Risk Zone Birmingham Region
Mark Clerical Employee DayTime L4: Medium Risk Zone Birmingham Re-
gion
Hannah Company Em-
ployee
DayTime L2: Low Risk Zone Birmingham Region
8.2.1.2 Role Hierarchy
The hierarchy of roles in the telecommunications company is depicted in Figure 8.3. The
figure shows that the Cable Engineer is a senior role in relation to a Technical Engineer,
while the Technical Engineer is senior to a Company Employee. In the same vein, a Clerical
Employee holds seniority over a Company Employee.
8.2.1.3 Separation of Duty between Roles
The telecommunications company requires that the same user should not be a Clerical
Employee and a Cable Engineer at the same time and at the same location.
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Table 8.3: Permissions to Roles Assignment Constraints
Role Permission Time Location
company employee P2 DayTime L2
cabling engineer P5
P2
DayTime L5
L2
technical engineer P4 DayTime L3
clerical employee P3 DayTime L4
Figure 8.3: Role Hierarchy
8.2.1.4 Cardinality Constraint over Roles
For health and safety reasons, the telecommunications company requires that no more
than 2 users should have the role Cable Engineer at location L1 (street cabinet) at the
same time.
8.3 Limitations of the STRBAC model
In this section we discuss some of the limitations of the current Spatio-Temporal Role
Based Access Control (STRBAC) model that we came across when modelling the case
study presented in Section 8.2 [30].
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8.3.1 Logical Location vs. Physical Location
Locations in CAC systems are specified as a set of logical entities. This model is not
sufficient for capturing access to resources. For example, because of doors and locks we
need to create a model which represents how access to a location requires credentials to
access another location.
8.3.2 Differences between Hierarchy of Location in the Cyber
and Physical Systems
In general, Location Hierarchy is a partial order on a set of locations that specifies which
location is inside another location (e.g. li is inside lj). In cyber systems this means that if
a user u is assigned a role r and its permission p at time t and at the outer location lj, then
the same user u can have role r and permission p at the inner location li. This may not be
true in PAC, where having permission to access to the outer location does not necessarily
mean the same user will be granted access to the inner locations. For example, in Figure
8.1, if a user u has permission to access location L1, this does not necessarily mean the
same user u will have permission to access any of the inner locations L2, L3 and L4. As
a result, hierarchy of location in PAC is not the same as the hierarchy in Cyber Access
Control.
8.4 The Proposed Model: Spatio-Temporal Role Based
Access Control for Physical Systems (STRBAC-
PS)
In this section we describe a new Spatio-Temporal Role Based Access Control for Physical
Systems (STRBAC-PS) framework which integrates different components of the RBAC
model with location and time in order to describe PAC specifications. Similar to other
Spatio-Temporal RBAC models, the STRBAC-PS model has basic sets of entities: Users
(U), Roles (R), Permissions (P) and Times (T). We also introduced Location Graph (LG)
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instead of Locations, which was represented as a finite set. We shall now formally describe
these entities, but before that we present the location models for PAC.
8.4.1 Extended Location Models for Physical Access Control
(PAC)
In the previous section we explained that the cyber model of location needs to be extended
to capture sufficient information for specifying PAC systems. In order to formalise the
physical location we introduced the Location Graph (LG) concept, which is a graphical
model that emphasises both the locality and connectivity of PAC systems.
Definition 5. Location Graph LG=(l0, L,E), where L is a finite set of nodes and E ⊆ L×L
is a set of directed edges connecting the nodes of L. Nodes in L, which are sometimes
called locations, consist of (possibly) multiple rooms, corridors, etc, so that if a person
can access one of them, then he/she can access all of them. L has a unique node called
an outside location, represented as l0 ∈ L, which represents the entire world outside
the premises. Edges E represent links which are marked by permissions. We define the
allocated permissions function as m : E → P ∪{}, where m(e) is the permission marking
edge e. e = (l, l′) shows the permissions required to go from l to l′. If m(e) = , then a
person does not need any permission to go from l to l′. Sometimes we simply write the
permissions on the edge to represent the allocated permission. In this case we can write
l
p−→ l′ to say that, in order to go from l to l′, permission p is required.
For example, the physical location depicted in Figure 8.2 can be represented using
the Location Graph, as illustrated in Figure 8.4 which shows that a user requires a set of
permissions in order to be able to move from one node to another. Moreover, it shows
that a user needs to have permission (p1) in order to move from node l0, which represents
the outside, to node L1 , which represents Building x .
This location model has sufficient information to deal with the two problems addressed
in Section 8.3.
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Figure 8.4: Location Graph
Notation: Assuming that LG = (l0, L, E) is the Location Graph as defined in Def-
inition 5, we write δ = l1
p1−→ l2 p2−→ l3..........lk−1 pk−1−−→ lk for a path of edges connecting
locations, in which pi represents permissions required to go from location li to li+1, where
i = 1, 2, 3, ......, k − 1.
8.4.2 Times (T)
Time is a set of continuous time intervals on a time line. In our STRBAC-PS model, it is
represented as recurring intervals which are constructed from primitive recurring intervals
through set operations. Suppose that access to common rooms in an organisation is only
permissible on weekdays from Monday to Thursday and during the working hours between
9:00am and 6:00pm. In this case, we need an access policy that can specify this recurring
interval. We represent these intervals in a manner similar to Bertino et al. [48]. Primitive
recurring intervals contain the following four calenders according to their period: Daily,
Weekly, Monthly and Yearly. Each calender may be divided further according to the
atomic interval of the time used: minute, day, week or month. An example of primitive
recurring intervals is 9:00am to 6:00pm, Monday to Friday, during November in 2012. In
this thesis we use the notation T={t1, t2, ......, tn} to mean that Times (T) is a finite set of
time intervals (i.e. t1, t2,....., tn), where n is an integer value.
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8.4.3 Users (U)
In Physical Access Control (PAC) systems, Users (U) can be a set of human beings. We
write U={u1, u2, ......, um} to mean that Users (U) is a finite set of users (i.e. u1, u2, ......, um),
where m is an integer value. Every user should have an ID card which in turn holds
information on the user profile such as the user’s ID and role(s). The user’s location
changes in line with time, and whenever a user tries to access a new zone the card reader
will reveal the location of the user. The relation that relates users to roles is described in
the next section.
8.4.4 Roles (R)
The user’s roles in Physical Access Control (PAC) systems are mainly categorised based
on the user’s job type (i.e. common employees and visitors). In our model, we formally
write R={r1, r2, ......, rk}, meaning that Roles is a finite set of roles (i.e. r1, r2, ......, rk), where
k is an integer value.
In PAC systems, roles are associated with other entities using two relations, namely
User Role Assignment and Permission Role Acquire. We will now describe User Role
Assignment, while Permission Role Acquire will be described later.
8.4.5 User Role Assignment (URA)
This relation associates users with roles based on time and location constraints. For
example, a user can be assigned to a cable engineer role in Birmingham, but only at a
specific time and in a specific location, URA ⊆ U × R × T × L. It is therefore a many-to-
many relation, which means that a user can be assigned to one role or more and the same
role can be assigned to one user or more. We write ura(u, r, t, l), meaning that the user u
is assigned to the role r during the intervals time t and at the node l.
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8.4.6 Permissions (P)
Permissions are the ability to access secured rooms, zones or buildings. In our STRBAC-
PS model, we formally denote Permissions (P) as P={p1, p2, ......, po} to mean that Per-
missions is a finite set of permissions (i.e. p1, p2, ......, po), where o is an integer value.
Permissions are assigned to users through roles, and the relation that associates these
roles with permissions based on time and location conditions is called Permission Role
Acquire, which we describe in the next subsection.
8.4.7 Permission Role Acquire (PRA)
Permission Role Acquire (PRA) is a relation that associates permissions with roles based on
time and location conditions. For example, the role cable engineer can have the permission
to access server room in Birmingham region only at specific time, PRA ⊆ R × P × T × L.
It is many-to-many relation. This means a role can have one permission or more and
the same permission can be assigned to one role or more. We formally write pra(r, p, t, l)
to mean that the role r is assigned to the permission p to access the node l during the
intervals in time t.
8.4.7.1 Impact of the Location Graph on Permission Role Acquire (PRA):
In order to gain physical access to an inner location in a building, for example a room,
a person needs to have access to a set of doors and corridors which allow him/her to go
through them and end up in the inner location. There might be multiple paths to the
inner location, but he/she needs to be able to go through at least one of them to reach to
the inner location. To formalise this process, consider a Location Graph LG = (l0, L, E)
as defined in Definition 5. Assume that a role r has permissions p to access a location l at
time t. In this case there exists at least one path of the form l0
p0−→ l1 p1−→ l2..........lk pk−→ l,
such that role r has all permissions p0, p1, p2, ........pk. In other words, ∀i pra(r, pi, t, li),
where 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1.
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8.4.8 Role Hierarchy (RH)
The Role Hierarchy concept is also an important factor for Physical Access Control (PAC).
Normally, roles in an organisation have overlaps in permission assignments. For example,
a company employee can have the same permissions as a visitor to access to coffee rooms,
and has additional permissions to access common rooms. Therefore, role hierarchies are
introduced as a key aspect of hierarchy in our STRBAC-PS model, in which a user who has
a senior role can inherit all the permissions assigned to a junior role. We write rh(ri  rj,
meaning that the role ri is senior to the role rj. This means that a user who has the senior
role ri can inherit the junior role rj and the senior role ri can inherit all the permissions
assigned to the junior role rj. We formally write this as follows:
rh(ri  rj) ∧ ura(u, ri, t, l) =⇒ ura(u, rj, t, l) ∧ pra(rj, p, t, l) =⇒ pra(ri, p, t, l)
8.4.9 Separation of Duty between Roles (SoDR)
Many organisations, when they design their Physical Access Control (PAC) system, re-
quire that some roles should not be assigned to the same users at the same time and the
same node. For example, an organisation such as a telecommunications company may
require that the same user should not be a Clerical Employee and a Cable Engineer at
the same time and in the same node. We write sodr(ri, rj , t, l). This means that the same
users should not have the two roles ri and rj at time t and node l. We formally write this
as follows:
sodr(ri, rj, t, l) =⇒ ura(u, ri, t, l) ∧ ¬ura(u, rj, t, l) ∨ ura(u, rj, t, l) ∧ ¬ura(u, ri, t, l)
8.4.10 Cardinality Constraint over Roles (CCoR)
Another important factor in Physical Access Control (PAC) is Cardinality Constraint
over Roles (CCoR). CCoR is a set of constraints that restrict the number of users who can
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have a role at a specific node and during a specific time. For example, an organisation
may require that the role Cable Engineer should not be assigned to more than n users at
the node, which represents the location street cabinet at any time. We write ccor(ri, t, l, n),
meaning that the role ri has restrictions, so that it should not be assigned to more than
n users at time t and node l. We formally denote this as follows:
ccor(ri, t, l, n) =⇒ #(ura(u, ri, t, l)) ≤ n
8.5 Analysing the running example using AC2Alloy
The most frequent question posed when modelling Access Control is whether or not the
specification is consistent with the functional requirements and is compliant with security
requirements. To answer such a question, we make use of AC2Alloy to generate an Alloy
model from the STRBAC-PS specification, and then we use an Alloy analyser to verify
the generated Alloy model.
8.5.1 Transformation of the Running example into Alloy
As described in Section 5.3.1, when we enter the the Access Control specification into the
AC2Alloy tool, an XML representation of the Access Control specification is automatically
generated and then the XML representation is automatically transformed into Alloy. The
basic components of the STRBAC-PS model, such as sets of Users, Permissions, Times
and Nodes, will be transformed to into Alloy signatures as illustrated in Figure 8.5.
The set of Roles will be transformed into signatures, facts and predicates. These facts
and predicates are used to represent the relationships between roles, users, permissions,
times and locations. Such relationships are expressed by User Role Assignment (URA)
and Permission Role Acquire (PRA). For example, AC2Alloy will transform the role Cable
Engineer and its User Role Assignment into abstract signature, one signature, fact and
predicate in Alloy, as shown in Figure 8.6.
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abstract sig Users{}
one sig Dave, Amy, Tom, Mark, Hannah, extends Users{}
abstract sig Nodes{}
one sig L1, L2, L3, L4, L5 extends Nodes{}
abstract sig Times{}
one sig DayTime, NightTime extends Times{}
abstract sig Permissions{}
one sig P1, P2, P3, P4, P5 extends Permissions{}
Figure 8.5: Transformation of Users, Permissions, Times and Nodes
abstract sig Roles {time: lone Times,
node: lone Nodes,
users: set Users,
permissions: set Permissions}
one sig CableEng extends Roles{}
fact CableEng_fact{all self: CableEng | CableEngCondition[self]}
pred CableEngCondition[self: CableEng]{((self.permissions= none)
&&(self.node= L2)&&(self.time= DayTime)&&(self.users=
Dave+Sarah+Tome ))||((self.permissions= none)&&(self.node=
L5)&&(self.time= DayTime)&&(self.users= Dave+Sarah+Tome))}
Figure 8.6: Example of a Roles Transformation
The Permission Role Acquire injects the predicate into the Alloy code for roles with
new assignment information. For example, the transformation of the Permission Role
Assignment of the role Cable Engineer will inject the predicate CableEngCondition into the
Alloy code for the role Cable Engineer with new assignment information, as depicted in
Figure 8.7.
Role Hierarchy also injects predicates into the Alloy code for roles with new assign-
ment information. For example, the effect of the transformation of the hierarchy between
the roles Clerical Employees and Company Employees will be transformed into new as-
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pred CableEngCondition[self: CableEng]{((self.permissions= P5)
&&(self.node= L5)&&(self.time= DayTime)&&(self.users=
Dave+Sarah+Tome ))||((self.permissions= P2)&&(self.node=
L2)&&(self.time= DayTime)&&(self.users= Dave+Sarah+Tome))}
Figure 8.7: Example of a Permission Role Acquire Transformation
signment information which will be injected into the predicates within the Alloy code for
the roles Clerical Employees. Moreover, the senior role Clerical Employees can inherit
all of the permissions assigned to the junior role Company Employees, in which case the
predicate ClerEmpCondition within the Alloy code for the role Clerical Employees will be
injected with new assignment information, as shown in the Alloy code depicted in Figure
8.8.
pred ClerEmpCondition[self: ClerEmp]{((self.permissions= P3)&&
(self.node= L4)&&(self.time= DayTime)&&(self.users= Mark))||
((self.permissions= P2)&&(self.node= L2)&&(self.time= DayTime)
&&(self.users= Mark ))}
Figure 8.8: Example of Role Hierarchy Transformation
8.5.2 Model Analysis
In the previous section we demonstrated the transformation between the Access Control
model and the corresponding Alloy. However, this work would be incomplete without
demonstrating how we can verify the produced Alloy model to detect inconsistencies.
In this section we provide a brief description of the automatic analysis task that was
carried out via the Alloy analyser, but beforehand we shall introduce several common
inconsistencies that occur in the Physical Access Control (PAC) policy.
1. A user has access to an inner zone but does not have access to the outer zone.
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2. A user has given default access to zones that are outside of his/her work region.
3. A user has two conflicting roles that are constrained by Separation of Duty between
Roles at the same time and the same location.
4. A user has the right to access two conflicting permissions that are constrained by
Separation of Duty between Permissions at the same time and the same location.
5. A role is assigned by a number of users that exceed the maximum number of users
that should be assigned to that role at the same time and the same location.
To ensure that the PAC system is consistent, several Alloy checks have been produced
via AC2Alloy. For example, an Alloy check will be generated with every Cardinality
Constraint, so that the check can be used to verify whether or not the constraint will
hold. An instance of this scenario is that the cardinality constraint over the role Cable
Engineer, which is presented in Section 8.2.1.4, will be transformed into an Alloy check,
as illustrated in Figure 8.9.
CC1 :check{((L5 in CableEng.node)&&
(DayTime in CableEng.time)=>(#CableEng.user <3))}
Figure 8.9: Example of a Cardinality Constraint Transformation
The execution of the Alloy check presented in Figure 8.9 shows that the Alloy analyser
picked up a counterexample, as depicted in Figure 8.10. This means that the policy is
inconsistent because there are more than two users (Tome, Dave and Sarah) are assigned
to the role Cabling Engineer at node L5, which represents the (street cabinet) during the
DayTime, which is not permissible according to the Cardinality constraint presented in
Section 8.2.1.4.
Another example of the Alloy checks that will be generated using AC2Alloy, in order to
perform analysis on PAC specifications, is that the Separation of Duty constraint between
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Figure 8.10: Counterexample for Cardinality check CC1
the roles Clerical Employee and Cable Engineer at the time DayTime and at node L4 will be
transformed into an Alloy check as depicted in Figure 8.11.
SoDR1 :check {
SODR[ClerEmp, CableEng, DayTime, L4]}
Figure 8.11: Alloy formula for the SoD between Clerical Employee and Cable Engineer
The execution of the above Alloy check shows that Alloy Analyser did not find a
counterexample as illustrated in Figure 8.12. This means that the Separation of Duty
constraint between the roles Clerical Employee and Cable Engineer at the time DayTime and
at the node L4 satisfies all the other rules of the PAC specification presented in Section
8.2.1.
Figure 8.12: The result of the Execution of SoDR1 check
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8.6 Chapter Summary
Chapter 8 provided an extension of the existing STRBAC model in a manner such that
it can be used to specify Physical Access Control (PAC) policies. Section 8.1 provided
some background information of Physical Access Control. Following this, we provided
a case study that is used to demonstrate our approach. The limitation of the existing
STRBAC model is discussed in Section 8.3. In Section 8.4 we presented our extension
of the STRBAC model to support the physical aspect of Access Control. Section 8.5,
described how AC2Alloy can be used to analyse the Physical Access Control specifications.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter concludes the work presented in this thesis. In Section 9.1, a summary of
the contributions made in this thesis is presented. Section 9.2 presents a discussion on
future work that could be undertaken to expand upon and improve this research.
9.1 Summary of Contributions
One of the main contribution of this thesis is that it presents formal algebraic notations
for the Spatio-Temporal Role Based Access Control (STRBAC) model, which are used to
formulate the concepts of inconsistency and semi-consistency in STRBAC specifications.
Another major contribution of our research is the development of two model transforma-
tion methods to transform Access Control specifications in the context of Spatio-Temporal
Role Based Access Control (STRBAC) into formal languages via Model-Driven Architec-
ture techniques for the purpose of analysing these specifications. In particular, this thesis
describes two model-driven approaches – AC2Alloy and AC2Uppaal. The first model
transformation, AC2Alloy, was developed to transform the STRBAC model into Alloy,
thus allowing for powerful analysis to take place using an Alloy analyser utilising SAT-
Solvers, while the second model transformation, AC2Uppaal, was developed to transform
the STRBAC model into Timed Automata and TCTL statements, following which the
Uppaal model checker was used to model and verify the Timed Automata and the TCTL
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statements to identify inconsistencies in STRBAC specifications. The feasibility of this
approach was demonstrated through a case study. We believe that the methodology that
we have used in this thesis to automate the transformation between STRBAC model and
formal representation such as Alloy and Timed Automata can be generalised and applied
in the domain of model transformations between other Access Control models and formal
methods. Moreover, the thesis presents a comparison study between Alloy and Timed
Automata from capability and performance points of view. Finally, we extend the cur-
rent STRBAC model to cover the physical aspect of Access Control. This is described
with the help of a case study offered by our industrial partner British Telecom (BT).
In Chapter 2 of the thesis, an introduction to Access Control is presented, in particular
Access Control models. This is followed by a review of existing work on the analysis of
Access Control specifications. Next, an introduction to Alloy, including various features
of the language, is presented. This is followed by an introduction to Timed Automata,
TCTL and the Uppaal model checker. Finally, a preliminary examination of MDA, with
a focus on a particular MDA model transformation framework, SiTra, is presented.
Formal algebraic notations for the STRBAC model are introduced in Chapter 3 and
are then used to provide a formal definition of inconsistencies in STRBAC specifications
and several scenarios that may cause inconsistencies in said specifications. This chapter
also uses these formal algebraic notations to introduce the concept of semi-consistency in
STRBAC specifications, and it gives several examples that may cause this scenario.
Chapter 4 presents an application for automatic transformations between the STR-
BAC and Alloy by defining a transformation model. Moreover, Chapter 4 introduces a
running example that is used later to describe the model transformation. The model
transformation, named AC2Alloy, is described in two stages – metamodels for the source
and target models and transformation rules to map the elements of the source and target
metamodels. To conduct the model transformation, a set of transformation rules are de-
fined in the second stage. These transformation rules are described with the help of the
running example.
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Chapter 5 describes the implementation of the transformation rules presented in Chap-
ter 4. The model transformation is implemented as an eclipse plug-in called AC2Alloy.
This chapter starts by outlining the architecture of the AC2Alloy tool, followed by de-
scriptions of the technologies used in developing the model transformation, AC2Alloy.
This is followed by a description of the eclipse plug-in AC2Alloy, which is a tool used for
integrating STRBAC and Alloy into a single tool. It enables the user to create STRBAC
specifications and transform them into XML representations which are then transformed
into an Alloy model. The chapter then introduces several Alloy checks that can be gen-
erated using AC2Alloy to conduct an analysis of the specifications via an Alloy analyser.
Finally, this chapter illustrates how the specifications of the running example can be
transformed into Alloy using AC2Alloy, and then it describes how the generated model
can be analysed using the Alloy analyser, in order to detect inconsistencies.
Chapter 6 describes a new model transformation named AC2Uppaal, which transforms
Access Control specifications in the context of the Spatio-Temporal Role Based Access
Control into Timed Automata network and TCTL statements. This chapter starts by
introducing the model transformation. The transformation rules that map the elements
of the source metamodel, STRBAC and the target metamodels, Timed Automata and
TCTL are described next with the help of the running example of the SECURE bank
system presented in Chapter 4. These transformation rules are then implemented as an
eclipse application called AC2Uppaal. Next, in order to demonstrate the visibility of our
approach, this chapter discusses how the running example can be transformed in Timed
Automata and TCTL and then performs the analysis using the Uppaal model checker to
detect inconsistencies.
Chapter 7 presents a comparison study between Alloy and the Uppaal tool from ca-
pability and performance points of view is presented. The comparison study is based on
a case study.
The extension of the STRBAC model for physical Access Control systems is presented
in Chapter 8. In this chapter, a case study provided by BT is presented, followed by an
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overview of the limitations of the current STRBAC model. Subsequently, an extension
of the STRBAC model, which supports the physical aspect of Access Control systems, is
presented. Finally, the method presented in Chapter 5 – AC2Alloy – is used to analyse
the physical Access Control specifications.
As an overall reflection, this thesis contributes two model-driven approaches – AC2Alloy
and AC2Uppal – that automate the transformation between the STRBAC model and Al-
loy and STRBAC and Timed Automata and TCTL, respectively. These model transfor-
mations then contribute towards the analysis of STRBAC specifications to identify any
erroneous design flaws. Next, a comparative study between the two Alloy and Timed
Automata methods is presented. Finally, the STRBAC model is extended to cover the
physical Access Control specifications. The entire research is described using various
examples.
9.2 Future Work
Following the advances made in this thesis, a number of directions for future research
have arisen. Some of these extensions would help to overcome some of the limitations of
this research, whilst others would provide additional capabilities.
The STRBAC model used in this research, as presented in Chapter 3, is a subset of
the STRBAC model derived from [12, 13]. Therefore, there are some elements that were
not considered in this research, such as Delegation. Delegation in the STRBAC model
is classified into two categories, namely Role Delegation and Permission Delegation [13].
Role Delegation means that the delegator delegates a role to the delegatee at any time
and at any location where the delegator can have that role, while Permission Delegation
means that the delegatee can invoke the delegator’s permissions at any time and at any
place where the delegator can invoke these permissions. This means new User Role
Assignment and Permission Role Acquire will be added as a result of the presence of Role
Delegation and Permission Delegation, respectively. Consequently, the transformation of
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Role Delegation and Permission Delegation can done in a similar way to that of Role
Hierarchy, as presented in Section 4.3.5 and Section 6.2.4. In addition, in [13], Ray and
Toahchoodee show how delegation can be transformed manually into Alloy. Therefore,
our approach can be extended directly to include elements such as delegation.
Plans are also being drawn up to enhance the existing STRBAC model for cyber-
physical Access Control systems [120, 121]. At present, the STRBAC model does not
support these systems’ specifications. A Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is the integration
of computing, communication and storage capabilities with monitoring and controlling
entities in the physical world [120]. An architecture for such a system is depicted in Fig-
ure 9.1 [123]. The emergence of these systems has had a revolutionary effect on medical
devices and systems, advanced automotive systems, process control, assisted living, traffic
control and safety, distributed robotics, energy conservation, instrumentation, critical in-
frastructure control, manufacturing, defence systems and smart structures [122]. Security
measures are crucial for CPS applications because entities within the systems interact not
only with each other, but also with the physical environment; thus, any security issues
must be addressed before CPS applications are deployed on a major basis.
Our initial research indicates that Access Control for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs)
depends on several factors, for instance the trustworthiness of entities and the environmen-
tal context. Entity trustworthiness plays a crucial role in Access Control for cyber-physical
systems because CPS does not have well-defined security parameters, and interactions be-
tween entities may be unidentified in advance. Moreover, because many entities in CPS
belong to the physical world, there is a need to include the impacts of physical security
into Access Control decisions in the cyber world. Although this thesis has presented an
extension of the STRBAC models to also cover the physical aspect of Access Control, in-
teractions between the two Access Control systems – cyber and physical – have not been
discussed. The overarching idea between the two types of Access Control is the concept
of trust, as the type of interaction an entity performs with another often depends on the
trust relationship between the two systems.
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Figure 9.1: Architecture of a Cyber-Physical System [123]
In traditional Access Control models, the concept of trust is implicit [43], which means
that only authorised users are totally trusted and acquire all the associated permissions,
while unauthorised users are totally untrusted and acquire no permissions whatsoever
[43]. Treating trust as a binary concept, determining whether or not a user can be
trusted completely may not be suitable for cyber-physical systems, as complete trust may
not be possible every time because an entity may only have incomplete knowledge of its
counterpart. Entities will not interact with untrusted counterparts, which will often result
in the unavailability of systems and services. Therefore, one area of research would be
to develop an appropriate non-binary trust framework that would be suitable for cyber-
physical systems. The new framework must conform to the concept of different degrees
of trust and identify how to quantify and measure the trust value for different devices
and users in these systems. Additionally, the model should define how trust evolves in a
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dynamic setting.
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APPENDIX A
SPATIO-TEMPORAL ROLE BASED ACCESS
CONTROL (STRBAC) METAMODEL
This section presents the XSD representation of the STRBAC metamodel that we have
created based on the formalisation of the STRBAC model presented in Chapter 3 to
conduct the model transformations AC2Alloy and AC2Uppaal presented in Chapter 4,
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this thesis.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
<xs:element name="STRBAC">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="users">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="user" type="userType" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="roles">
<xs:complexType>
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<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="role" type="roleType" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="permissions">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="permission" type="permissionType"
maxOccurs="unbounded" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="times">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="time" type="timeType" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="locations">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="location" type="locationType"
maxOccurs="unbounded" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
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<xs:element name="userRoleAssignments">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="userRoleAssignment" type="URAType"
maxOccurs="unbounded" minOccurs="0" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="permissionRoleAquires">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="permissionRoleAquire" type="PRAType"
maxOccurs="unbounded" minOccurs="0" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="roleHierarchies">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="roleHierarchy" type="roleHierarchyType"
maxOccurs="unbounded" minOccurs="0" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="locationHierarchies">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="locationHierarchy" type="locationHierarchyType"
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maxOccurs="unbounded" minOccurs="0" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="SODRS">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="SODR" type="SODRType" maxOccurs="unbounded"
minOccurs="0" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="SODPS">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="SODP" type="SODPType" maxOccurs="unbounded"
minOccurs="0" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="SODRPS">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="SODRP" type="SODRPType" maxOccurs="unbounded"
minOccurs="0" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
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<xs:element name="Cardinalities">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Cardinality" type="cardType"
maxOccurs="unbounded" minOccurs="0" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="RoleUnassignments">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="RoleUnassigned" type="roleUnassignmentType"
maxOccurs="unbounded" minOccurs="0" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="PermissionUnassignments">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="PermissionUnassigned" type="permissionUnassignmentType"
maxOccurs="unbounded" minOccurs="0" />
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:complexType name="userType">
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<xs:attribute name="user_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="roleType">
<xs:attribute name="role_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="permissionType">
<xs:attribute name="permission_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="timeType">
<xs:attribute name="time_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="locationType">
<xs:attribute name="location_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="URAType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="user" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="role" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="time" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="location" type="xs:IDREF" />
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="URAType_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
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</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="PRAType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="role" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="permission" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="time" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="location" type="xs:IDREF" />
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="PRAType_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="roleHierarchyType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="seniorRole" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="juniorRole" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="time" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="location" type="xs:IDREF" />
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="roleHierarchy_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="SODRType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="role" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="role2" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="time" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="location" type="xs:IDREF" />
</xs:sequence>
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<xs:attribute name="SODR_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="SODPType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="permission" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="permission2" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="time" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="location" type="xs:IDREF" />
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="SODP_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="SODRPType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="role" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="permission" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="time" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="location" type="xs:IDREF" />
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="SODRP_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="locationHierarchyType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="location" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="location2" type="xs:IDREF" />
</xs:sequence>
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<xs:attribute name="LH_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="cardType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="role" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="time" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="location" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="cardinality" type="xs:int" />
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="card_id" type="xs:ID" use="required">
</xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="roleUnassignmentType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="role" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="time" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="location" type="xs:IDREF" />
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="roleUnassign_id" type="xs:ID" use=
"required"></xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="permissionUnassignmentType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="role" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="time" type="xs:IDREF" />
<xs:element name="location" type="xs:IDREF" />
</xs:sequence>
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<xs:attribute name="permissionUnassign_id" type="xs:ID"
use="required"></xs:attribute>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:schema>
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APPENDIX B
ALLOY MODEL OF THE SECURE BANK
SYSTEM EXAMPLE IN SECTION 4.1
This section presents the complete Alloy textual code automatically generated from the
STRBAC specifications relating to the SECURE bank system presented in Section 4.1,
using the AC2Alloy model transformation presented in Chapter 5. Some comments have
been manually inserted to illustrate which part of the model came from which part of the
STRBAC specifications.
// Module declaration
module STRBAC
// Corresponds to the Element Users
abstract sig Users{}
one sig Dave, Hanna, Mark, Sarah extends Users{}
// Corresponds to the Element Locations
abstract sig Location{}
one sig Office1, Office2 extends Locations{}
// Corresponds to the Element Times
abstract sig Times{}
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one sig DayTime, NightTime extends Times{}
// Corresponds to the Element Permissions
abstract sig Permissions{}
one sig RWACF, RWACMF, RWLF, RWTF extends Permissions{}
// Corresponds to the Element Roles
abstract sig Roles{
time: lone Times,
location: lone Locations,
permissions: set Permissions,
users: set Users}
// Corresponds to the role Accounting Manager and URA,
// PRA and RH related to it.
one sig AcountingManager extends Roles{}
fact AcountingManager_fact{all self: AcountingManager |
AcountingManagerCondition[self]}
pred AcountingManagerCondition[self: AcountingManager]{
((self.permissions = RWACF)&&(self.location = Office1)&&
(self.time = DayTime)&&(self.users = Mark))||((self.permissions =RWACMF)
&&(self.location =Office1)&&(self.time =NightTime)&&(self.users =Dave))}
// Corresponds to the role Loan Officer and URA, PRA
// and RH related to it.
one sig LoanOfficer extends Roles{}
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fact LoanOfficer_fact{all self: LoanOfficer | LoanOfficerCondition[self]}
pred LoanOfficerCondition[self: LoanOfficer]{
((self.permissions = RWLF)&&(self.location = Office2)&&
(self.time = DayTime)&&(self.users =Sarah))}
// Corresponds to the role Accountant and URA, PRA
// and RH related to it.
one sig Accountant extends Roles{}
fact Accountant_fact{all self: Accountant | AccountantCondition[self]}
pred AccountantCondition[self: Accountant]{
((self.permissions = RWACF)&&(self.location = Office1)&&(self.time =
DayTime)&&(self.users = Hanna))}
// Corresponds to the role Teller and URA, PRA and
// RH related to it.
one sig Taller extends Roles{}
fact Taller_fact{all self: Taller | TallerCondition[self]}
pred TallerCondition[self: Taller]{((self.permissions = RWTF)
&&(self.location = Office2) && (self.time = DayTime)&&
(self.users = Sarah))}
//SOD between Roles (Loan Officer and Teller)
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pred SODR[r1, r2 :Roles, l: Locations, t: Times]{
all u: Users | ((u in r1.users) &&(t in r1.time)&&(l in r1.location)
&&(t in r2.time)&&(l in r2.location)&&(u != no_users))=>
((u not in r2.users)&&(t in r2.time)&&(l in r2.location)) }
SoDR1 :check {SODR[Taller, LoanOfficer, Office2, DayTime]}
//SOD between Permissions (RWTF and RWLF)
pred SODP1[p1, p2 :Permissions, l: Locations, t: Times]{
all r1: Roles |((p1 in r1.permissions) &&(t in r1.time)&&
(l in r1.location))=>((p2 not in r1.permissions)&&(t in r1.time)
&&(l in r1.location))}
pred SODP2[p1, p2 :Permissions, l: Locations, t: Time]{
all r1, r2 : Roles, u: Users | ((p1 in r1.permissions)
&&(t in r1.time)&&(l in r1.location)&&(u in r1.users)&&
(t in r2.time)&&(l in r2.location)&&(u in r2.users)=>
((p2 not in r2.permissions)&&(t in r2.time)&&
(l in r2.location)&&(u in r2.users))) }
SoDP1 :check {SODP1[ RWTF, RWLF, Office2, DayTime]}
// Cardinality Constraint over Role
CCP :check {
((Office2 in AcountingManager.location)&&(DayTime in
AcountingManager.time)=>(#AcountingManager.users < 2))}
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// Cardinality Constraint over Permissions
CCP :check {
((Office2 in AcountingManager.location)&&(DayTime in
AcountingManager.time)=>(#AcountingManager.permissions < 2))}
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APPENDIX C
TIMED AUTOMATA AND TCTL STATEMENTS
FOR THE SECURE BANK SYSTEM EXAMPLE IN
SECTION 4.1
C.1 Timed Automata
This section presents the complete graphical representations of the Timed Automata
which were automatically generated from the Spatio-Temporal Role Based Access Control
(STRBAC) specifications relating to the SECURE bank system presented in Section 4.1,
using the AC2Uppaal model transformation presented in Chapter 6. Figure C.1 shows
the graphical representation of the Timed Automaton generated for the set of Times in
the SECURE bank system example and Figures C.2, C.3, C.4 and C.5 show the Timed
Automaton generated for the users Dave, Sarah, Hanna and Mark respectively.
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Figure C.1: Timed Automaton generated for the set of Times
Figure C.2: Timed Automaton generated for the user Dave
Figure C.3: Timed Automaton generated for the user Sarah
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Figure C.4: Timed Automaton generated for the user Hanna
Figure C.5: Timed Automaton generated for the user Mark
C.2 TCTL Statements
This section presents the complete TCTL statements which were automatically generated
from the STRBAC specifications pertaining to the SECURE bank system presented in
Section 4.1, using the AC2Uppaal model transformation presented in Chapter 6. Some
comments have been manually inserted to illustrate which part of the model came from
which part of the STRBAC specifications.
/* TCTL Statement for the following Permission Role Acquire:
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(Accountant, RWAMF, Daytime, Office2) */
A[] (Sarah.DaytimeOffice2 and Sarah.Teller or\
Dave.DaytimeOffice2 and Dave.Teller or\
Hanna.DaytimeOffice2 and Hanna.Teller or\
Mark.DaytimeOffice2 and Mark.Teller )
/* TCTL Statement for the following Permission Role Acquire:
(Loan Officer, RWLF, Daytime, Office2) */
A[] (Sarah.DaytimeOffice2 and Dave.LoanOfficer or\
Dave.DaytimeOffice2 and Dave.LoanOfficer or\
Hanna.DaytimeOffice2 and John.LoanOfficer or\
Mark.DaytimeOffice2 and Mark.LoanOfficer )
/* TCTL Statement for the following Permission Role Acquire:
(Accountant, RWAMF, Daytime, Office1) */
A[] (Sarah.DaytimeOffice1 and Sarah.AccountingManager or\
Dave.DaytimeOfficeQ and Dave.AccountingManager or\
Hanna.DaytimeOffice1 and Hanna.AccountingManager or\
Mark.DaytimeOffice1 and Mark.AccountingManager )
/* TCTL Statement for the following Permission Role Acquire:
(Accounting Manager, RWAMF, Nighttime, Office1) */
A[] (Sarah.NighttimeOffice1 and Sarah.AccountingManager or\
Dave.NighttimeOffice1 and Dave.AccountingManager or\
Hanna.NighttimeOffice1 and Hanna.AccountingManager or\
Mark.NighttimeOffice1 and Mark.AccountingManager )
/* TCTL Statement for the following Permission Role Acquire:
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(Accountant, RWAF, Daytime, Office1) */
A[] (Sarah.DaytimeOffice1 and Sarah.Accountant or\
Dave.DaytimeOffice1 and Dave.Accountant or\
Hanna.DaytimeOffice1 and Hanna.Accountant or\
Mark.DaytimeOffice1 and Mark.Accountant )
/* TCTL Statement for the following Role Hierarchy:
(Accounting Manager, Accountant, Daytime, Office1) */
A[] (Sarah.DaytimeOffice1 and Sarah.Accountant or\
Dave.DaytimeOffice1 and Dave.Accountant or\
Hanna.DaytimeOffice1 and Hanna.Accountant or\
Mark.DaytimeOffice1 and Mark.Accountant )
/* TCTL Statement for the following Separation of Duty constraint:
(Teller, Loan Officer, Daytime, Office2) */
A[]((Sarah.DaytimeOffice2 imply not (Sarah.Teller and Sarah.LoanOfficer))
and\ (Dave.DaytimeOffice2 imply not (Dave.Teller and Dave.LoanOfficer))
and\ (Hanna.DaytimeOffice2 imply not (Hanna.Teller and Hanna.LoanOfficer))
and\ (Mark.DaytimeOffice2 imply not (Mark.Teller and Mark.LoanOfficer)))
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APPENDIX D
ALLOY EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The following five tables present the results of using Alloy for analysing the Access Con-
trol specifications of the SECURE bank system. Every table shows the time required
to complete the analysis of the Access Control specification when one of the following
elements of the STRBAC is increased while the other elements remain fixed.
Table D.1: Alloy Evaluation Result – Increasing the number of Users
Table D.2: Alloy Evaluation Result – Increasing the number of Roles
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Table D.3: Alloy Evaluation Result – Increasing the number of URA
Table D.4: Alloy Evaluation Result – Increasing the number of PRA
Table D.5: Alloy Evaluation Result – Increasing the number of RH
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APPENDIX E
TIMED AUTOMATA EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The following five tables present the results of using Timed Automata for analysing the
Access Control specifications of the SECURE bank system. Every table shows the time
required to complete the analysis of the Access Control specification when one of the
following elements of the STRBAC is increased while the other elements remain fixed.
Table E.1: Timed Automata Evaluation Result – Increasing the number of Users
Table E.2: Timed Automata Evaluation Result – Increasing the number of Roles
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Table E.3: Timed Automata Evaluation Result – Increasing the number of URA
Table E.4: Timed Automata Evaluation Result – Increasing the number of PRA
Table E.5: Timed Automata Evaluation Result – Increasing the number of RH
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